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The topic of this master thesis is the European Union foreign and security policy. More 
detailed, what sort of foreign policy EU is implementing through its military operation EU 
NAVFOR Atalanta launched to prevent and combat piracy of the coast of Somalia, and 
which kind of power position it is seeking through it internationaly. The theoretical 
framework creating the structure of the research comes from Hans Morgenthau and his 
realistic theory, which he introduced more in detail in his book caled Politics Among Nations 
– The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). In this book, he separates three diferent policy 
types based on the state’s foreign policy: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo and 
policy of prestige. The method of the research is directed content analysis. 
 
Al the state’s actions, especialy the ones that are considered to belong to the area of foreign 
politics, are somehow after power: they either seek to increase, stabilize or show of it. 
Consequently, the objective is to recognize whether EU is trying to acquire more power, hold 
on to its present power or mainly just demonstrating its power through Operation Atalanta. 
Furthermore, embarking upon the identification of the foreign policy type alows us to further 
see what kind of power distribution EU is seeking in relation to other security actors. By 
recognizing EU’s global ambitions and how it seeks to pursue them in the international 
security arena predictions can be made of EU’s future engagement beyond its borders in the 
field of foreign and security politics. 
 
The analysis shows that EU is implementing mainly policy of prestige in the context of 
Operation Atalanta; in the beginning policy of prestige contributing towards status quo and 
later policy of prestige to increase power. Its main purpose was to bring visibility and 
 
 
recognition to EU as a global security actor and increase its estimation of power 
internationaly. Through acquiring more equal power distribution it was trying to place itself 
next to other big security actors and thus present itself as a credible and capable alternative 
security source. However, its fundamental objective was not to overthrow the present power 
balance completely but to make adjustments and shift the power structures towards more 
beneficial to its global actorness. 
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1. Introduction 
If there is no struggle, there is no progress (Frederick Douglas.) 
After a long European economic integration during the cold war times, European Union 
(EU) was formaly established in 1993. Its most important aim was to be an economical 
union increasing the cooperation between its member states. From the beginning, EU has 
expanded not only by number of its member states but also by its functions. The Treaty of 
Maastricht established EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) already at 1992 
and since then the EU has increasingly been strengthening its role in international contexts 
through al policy divisions. Solely an economic cooperation has extended its scope and 
policy agenda into for example political, legal, security and foreign relations areas, and 
broaden its influence beyond the European region through inter alia its development policy 
and military operations. It has formed its new foreign policy framework that is more 
coherent, consistent and visible than ever before. 
As EU has engaged itself in actions beyond the economic dimension also the expectations 
from it have grown higher. New emerging and more diverse security chalenges are caling 
for a greater response from the international community. EU can be seen as a viable option 
to balance the hegemony of the United States in this regard. Even though the current 
economic crisis, it and its member states would definitely have the military means to do that. 
The question however is, does EU have the motivation to shift the power structures and 
claim itself as a global security player? The answer has not been unambiguous. EU has failed 
to take a common stand in many crisis situations even geographicaly on the edge of its 
borders and having a common front and talking with only one voice has not been actualized 
properly. Despite this, EU's high-level oficials and decision-makers have been increasingly 
caling for EU's responsibility to work as an important actor outside the EU area in the field 
of security (Keisala 2004; Solana 2005). The strengthening of EU’s CFSP and later actions 
taken in the field of peacekeeping and military operations in Africa for example seem to be 
teling another story and demonstrate that, instead of a liaison between European states 
bringing economical security, EU is in fact trying to answer the cal for international actions 
in the field of foreign and security politics and is more and more asserting itself as an 
important actor with a biger role, status and impact world-wide. 
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1.1. Background and relevance 
The topic of this master thesis is the European Union’s foreign and security policy. More 
detailed, what sort of foreign policy EU is practicing in the contexts of one of its latest 
operations, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, and which kind of power position it is seeking through 
it. The theoretical framework, that creates the structure of this research, comes from Hans 
Morgenthau and his realistic theory, which he introduced more detailed in his book caled 
Politics Among Nations - The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). In this book, 
Morgenthau separates three diferent policy types based on the states foreign policy: policy 
of imperialism, policy of status quo and policy of prestige. According to Morgenthau, we 
can describe the power of people as we can describe power of states. Foreign politics for him 
is nothing else than atempts to increase, stabilize or show of power. Al the states actions, 
especialy the ones that are considered to belong to the area of foreign politics, are somehow 
after the power, no mater if its power for status quo, imperialism or prestige (Morgenthau 
1960). Consequently, the objective for me is to see, whether the exact policy EU is 
practicing through operation Atalanta can be categorized within one of these three policy 
types and seek to understand the motivations of certain decisions EU has made along this 
operation and with its foreign policy development in more general level through that. 
The operation Atalanta was launched in 2008 in accordance with the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 caling for protection of World Food 
Program (WFP) vessels delivering food aid to Somalia to repress al sorts of acts of piracy 
and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. The operation and its launch received a lot of 
support from both, the member countries and countries that are not part of the EU. Overal, 
27 countries had participated on the operation until January 2013. It operates next to 
independently deployed counter-piracy missions of individual countries like South Korea, 
China, India, Japan and Russia as wel as North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
Operation Ocean Shield and multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) operations 
Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 and 151. U.S. is one of the main contributors to the CMF 
and CTF 150 and 151 have also been commanded by Commanded by a U.S. Navy Vice 
Admiral. In 2012 Atalanta was extended to continue til December 2014. 
The operation Atalanta was launched through European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into a force in 2009, it also reformed the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The reforms were intended to make CFSP more 
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coherent and increase its visibility (Europa 2010). CFSP established for example the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and created the position of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Afairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, it 
developed new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to replace the previous 
ESDP, and this created a new foundation for operation Atalanta. Operation Atalanta is 
among the first operations working under this new foundation. 
From 2008 til now, there has been many oficial reports and statements about the operation 
saying the same thing; operation is important when making the European CFSP known 
outside Europe, it is a good way for EU to get international experience in working globaly 
and, also, it is important in making EU credible next to the big international security actors 
like NATO, United States and so on (Basil and Smith 2009, 583; House of Lords 2010; 
Stubb 2010). Based on the CFSP and the statements and reports from Atalanta it seems that 
EU is keener on working globaly in the field of security politics and increasing its impact 
beyond the European continent. 
Atalanta is the second military operation from EU going beyond the European continent that 
is launched independently. The first one, operation Artemis, was started in 2003 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. As aforementioned, the EU foreign policy has changed after 
that. Already the operation in Congo brought up questions and arguments against EU geting 
involved and interfering in actions and events that are not in close contact to it. It was also 
under debates why is EU acting like a state even though it is not one (Norheim-Martisen 
2011). Now, after the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP is transformed to be even more similar to 
nation states’ foreign policies. It is more unified, coherent and has more tasks than the 
previous one. The operation Atalanta went also through severe critique, similar and different. 
There were already operations working against piracy at the coast of Somalia. Also, the 
situation in Somalia was seen so dificult and complex that merely detaining pirates was not 
seen as a feasible solution for the problems (Ehrhart and Petreto 2012, 32-34; 
Nnwobunwene and Orubani 2010, 567-569). Yet stil most of the EU member countries 
decided to participate in the operation. 
Why was the support of the operation from the member countries so high? And was there a 
reason other than economic or humanitarian to get the operation to start so fast after the UN 
resolution? The statements given and the official reports would most certain answer both of 
the questions. The operation was important for EU and later especialy for CFSP for 
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receiving international visibility and transforming EU into a credible and strong security 
actor globaly. Both of these objectives sound like a state seeking imperialism and prestige 
through its foreign policy according to Morgenthau. They are both means of struggling to 
increase and show of power in international field. So is European Union’s foreign and 
security policy based on the Operation Atalanta imperial or prestige? Or can it be, in its 
struggle for power, stil status quo? According to Morgenthau, to give meaning to a factual 
raw material of foreign policy, we need to approach it with a rational outline or roadmap that 
suggests meanings for it (Morgenthau 1960, 5). My roadmap giving meaning is that, indeed, 
EU is implementing one of this three foreign policy types and is seeking power. 
The relevance in researching EU’s foreign policy type is indubitable; finding out the 
embedded interests in actions through which EU engages itself with functions beyond its 
borders could be used to predict the direction where EU’s heading in regard to its future 
actions and power position next to other big global security players like United States and 
NATO. According to Morgenthau, “We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of 
interest defined as power […] This assumption alows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, 
the steps of statesmen – past, present, or future – has taken or wil take on the political scene. 
[…] Thinking of terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested 
observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps beter than he, the actor on the 
political scene, does himself” (Morgenthau 1960, 5). If EU is seen to be practicing status 
quo-policy it wil not necessarily further expand its scope to continents far away with no 
imminent danger to its safety or economic welbeing. However, if EU is demonstrated to be 
imperialistic in the sense of Morgenthau, it would increasingly be chalenging other global 
actors in responding to many international crises in the future. 
Consequently, the power structures of the present global politics in the field of security 
might be changing and EU could strategicaly be pushing itself towards the core. Social 
situations are answered with repetitive paterns. When the situation is recognized in its 
identity with previous situations, it evokes same response. However, if the maters are 
subject to dynamic change, like power structures, these traditional paters are no longer valid 
but need to be replaced by new ones reflecting this dynamic change (Morgenthau 2006, 7). 
Understanding where the EU’s priorities lie in the sphere of foreign politics wil help to 
understand the paterns of EU responding to crisis situations, and whether it could in the 
future be an alternative security source wiling to take actions beyond its backyard. 
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1.2. Research question and the scope of the research 
The specific research question of this thesis is: based on the oficial reports, news, 
statements and legal basis of Operation Atalanta, what kind of foreign policy is EU 
implementing and which sort of position it is trying to achieve internationaly through it? 
Furthermore, did this policy type change after the Treaty of Lisbon, and if so, how can it be 
seen through action; Operation Atalanta?  
As aforementioned, I wil think the question through Hans Morgenthau's theory which he 
introduced in more detailed manner in his book caled Politics Among Nations – The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). In this book, Morgenthau separates three diferent 
policy types based on the states foreign policy: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo 
and policy of prestige. Which one of these is the EU implementing through the Operation 
Atalanta and what is it trying to achieve by it?  
The core issue for researcher is always to acknowledge the paradigms of the research (Perry 
and Sobh 2005). In brief, a paradigm is the conceptual framework within to do research and 
it can be regarded as the “basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator” 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, 105). Political realism “believes […] in the possibility of 
distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion – between what is true objectively and 
rationaly, supported by evidence and iluminated by reason, and what is only a subjective 
judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful 
thinking” (Morgenthau 1960, 4). Like positivists, also political realists believe that there is 
an objective universal truth of political and this truth can be accessible through observation 
and human reason. Even though realism is often considered to be dogmatic and even naïve in 
its epistemology, it serves wel on my research as it is not monolithic but its paradigm 
enables more complex approaches to research (Hindrén 2007, 6). 
When the Treaty of Lisbon came in to the force, the EU foreign policy was amended as wel. 
Some of the goals and means of the policy also changed during that time to make the policy 
more coherent and thus stronger globaly. Operation Atalanta has worked basing 
fundamentaly on both, the old and new, foundations. As always in the field of transnational 
cooperation the actual writen resolutions, decisions and doctrines are smoothened to appear 
more general and nondescript. Any hidden agendas there may be are cleverly hidden as the 
edges are evened out. Therefore, to actualy study what kind of foreign policy is EU 
implementing and which sort of international position it wants to achieve, it wil be more 
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beneficial to actualy study the action, and its change, that is caried out within the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy but outside EU area instead of just focusing on the 
policy doctrines. 
People often use the old phrase "actions speak louder than words". The same applies to my 
research. Action verifies reality, reveals embedded motives and demonstrates certain desires. 
For Morgenthau, political theory needs to judge the political qualities of intelect, wil and 
actions, since only concentrating on motives can be futile and deceptive. In other words, the 
true nature of the policy is often concealed by ideological justifications and political realism 
is determined to unveil the embedded interest behind the policy doctrines. Motives wil give 
us a clue of what the direction of foreign policy might be, but merely through studying 
motives and doctrines, we cannot predict the future. “Statesmen, especialy under 
contemporary conditions, may wel make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms 
of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to get popular support on them” 
(Morgenthau 1960, 7). For him, realistic theory is ascertaining facts and giving them 
meaning through reason. Character of foreign policy can be determined through examination 
of political acts performed and from the foreseeable consequences of these acts (Morgenthau 
1960, 5). By studying EU action, Operation Atalanta, as its struggle for power, no mater if 
for prestige, imperialism or status quo, my aim is to make more sense of its significance to 
the global power distribution and structures than merely studying EU foreign policy 
doctrines. 
The decision to choose Operation Atalanta instead of some other EU operation was 
important to my research seting and indeed assisted with the problematization of the topic. 
The aforementioned fact that the operation is launched independently outside the EU 
teritory and has been on action throughout the change of EU’s security doctrine was an 
important factor. Furthermore, as Atalanta received a large amount of support despite that it 
represented huge risk for EU forces, there were already other operations on place on the 
region to secure the vessels and that the problems of Somalia that lead to piracy are so 
complex that the eforts and original functions of Atalanta would not help bringing a 
sustainable solution to it, the implication for other motives than merely humanitarian and 
economic ones stays strong (Nnwobunwene and Orubani 2010; Page 2011, 27). Since the 
thesis has its limitations for what comes to its length, it was important to choose a case that 
include al of these aspects to later draw more general conclusions of EU’s foreign policy 
type and its desire for power. The other option, to choose multiple diferent operations, was 
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excluded due to the reason that I rather wanted to achieve a deep understanding of the issue 
and analyze it in an in-depth manner. Choosing multiple operations might have left the 
analysis quite shalow. 
Furthermore, there are other aspects that have been left out from this research. Naturaly, 
since no political player can act in a historical or pragmatic vacuum, every political decision 
has complexity of underlying motivations behind them (Ali-Laurila 2005, 10; Grant 1998, 
148). Similarly Morgenthau notes that real man is a composite out of economic man, 
political man, religious man (Morgenthau 1960, 14). In regard to the Operation Atalanta, 
EU’s and its dominant member states’ economic and geostrategic motivations, for instance, 
are quite noticeable. The Gulf of Aden is important to maritime trade – it is the fastest 
transportation route of goods from Europe to Asia. The piracy efects directly to the 
countries that transport goods waterways. Many of these countries are EU member states. 
The overal costs of Somali piracy to the global economy was estimated to be between 5.7 
and 6.1 bilion in 2012 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013). Notwithstanding that the economic 
interest of EU to engage with the region prevails, I do not see the relevance to include it per 
se to this research. According to Morgenthau: 
The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape 
of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This 
concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics 
and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and 
understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics. (Morgenthau 1984, 5). 
By excluding the economic aspect from the scope of the thesis, I can concentrate only to the 
foreign and security policy perspective in terms of interests defined as power, and highlight 
the EU’s operational struggle for global power in a realistic framework instead of adding the 
EU economic discourse and member states’ national economic interests to the political 
research sphere. However, as “[t]he political realist is not unaware of the existence and the 
relevance of standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon political sphere”, also 
this thesis acknowledges that the underlying national and economic interests remain but 
subordinates them in the analysis (Morgenthau 1960, 12). Indeed, as in realistic theory, also 
the autonomy of the political sphere in this research does not by any means imply 
disregarding the existence and importance of other spheres of thought, but rather lets them to 
be analyzed in their own spheres with their own terms. Nevertheless, at the end of the thesis, 
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when trying to achieve more comprehensive understanding of what determines EU’s 
international security engagement, it wil be necessary to tie the results of the analysis to the 
bigger picture that contains also other spheres than merely political. (Morgenthau 1960, 11-
12.) 
1.3. Research method and material 
When choosing a research method, one has to contemplate between the options available 
keeping in mind the empirical material used and objectives of the research: what kind of 
empirical data am I using, what kind of answers am I hoping to find, and which kind of 
method realy helps me revealing these answers and meanings (Hirsijärvi et al. 2009, 123-
132). First division comes already at the very beginning of the research when defining the 
research question and selecting the empirical material: is my research quantitative or 
qualitative. As my objective in this research is to understand in-depth the reasons why EU 
has acted how it has in the context of Operation Atalanta – to achieve, stabilize or show-of 
power – qualitative method is more applicable. Using qualitative method wil give me beter 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon and enables going further than merely 
observing the empirical data – it enables the interpretation of the meanings in the curent 
political context (Palonen 1998). 
In qualitative research the empirical data can be everything from one case or an interview to 
multiple ones. As the goal is not to find statistical regularities but “to provide knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study”, the amount of material suficient depends 
on the context (Downe-Wamboldt 1992, 314). Furthermore, also the type of primary 
material depends on the context. Basicaly, it can be everything between books, speeches, 
reports, interviews, legal norms, strategies and so forth (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004). In this 
thesis, the empirical material consists out of the relevant Council Decisions, Council 
Conclusions and Council Joint Actions regarding Operation Atalanta and its predecessor EU 
NAVCO as wel as relevant press releases of Atalanta that can be found in the EU’s oficial 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta–website. Furthermore, I have decided to include the Council 
Conclusion of Horn of Africa and EU Strategic Framework as they primarily guide the EU 
engagement and al of its actions in the Horn of Africa region. 
The first Council Joint Action is from 19 September 2008 launching the EU Operation 
NAVCO in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816. The reason for including this 
for my empirical material is that this coordinated national response guided the launch of 
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Operation Atalanta only two months later. The folowing documents are the Council Joint 
Action from November 2008 planning the launch and Council Decision from 8 December 
2008 finaly officialy launching the Operation Atalanta. The official Council Conclusions 
and Council Decisions included after 2008 are the ones that are extending the operation 
somehow, either timely or by its scope and activities. These include 6 documents, from 
which the last one is from 23 March 2012. In addition to these, it is important to include the 
Council Conclusion on the Horn of Africa from 14 November 2011 and EU Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa establishing the EU’s comprehensive approach to the 
region. The reasoning behind this is, that the Strategic Framework creates the setings in 
which Operation Atalanta operates and articulates the primary objectives, chalenges, 
engagement and future directions of EU in the region, thus making it easier to grasp EU’s 
underlying motives behind certain actions and categorize these motives under specific 
foreign policy categories. 
Lastly, I have decided also to include relevant oficial news releases of Operation Atalanta 
from EU NAVFOR Atalanta oficial website. Al in al, the website has litle more than 1000 
news releases regarding Atalanta from 2008 to April 2014. However, as most of these news 
are rather describing in detail piracy atacks and the tactics how they were repeled and 
prevented, and therefore not relevant in regard to my research question as to help me 
revealing the fundamental political aspirations of EU, I have pruned out most of them. 
Eventualy, I ended up using 39 diferent short news releases that were able to help me 
distinguish the dominating themes and underlying functions of the operation and give me 
clearance of the methods of the mission as wel as find EU foreign policy objectives within 
them. I am also going to include publications, researches, and statements of the operation as 
wel as EU's foreign policy development and doctrines in my thesis to show the framework 
the within policy is implemented, but these are going to work as a secondary material. 
Diferent types of researches require diferent research models and analysis techniques 
(Knafl and Howard 1984). After thinking thoroughly my research purpose together with the 
empirical material, I came into conclusion that the most applicable method for this research 
is directed content analysis. Content analysis is considered to be a flexible method for 
analyzing text material systematicaly and objectively (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004; Weber 
1990). It fits for analyzing unstructured material not intended necessarily on research 
purposes. Qualitative content analysis provides means to organize and arange empirical 
material to compact and transparent form and enables creating a coherent, verbal description 
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of the phenomenon (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004). It goes beyond counting words to examine 
the language intensively through categorizing larger amount of text with the similar 
meanings (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Weber 1990). As my empirical material is combined 
from relevant resolutions, decisions, oficial statements and news releases, directed content 
analysis provides recourses needed to recognize the important parts of the extensive 
documents, categorize them according to the theoretical framework, and interpret the 
meanings from them. 
Content analysis can be divided into three distinct approaches that difer slightly according 
to which authors’ model is folowed. I have decided to use the one from Hsiuh-Fang Hsieh 
and Sharah E. Shannon, which they introduced in their article Three Approaches to 
Qualitative Content Analysis (2005). In that article, content analysis is divided into 
conventional, directed and summative analysis. The major diferences between these ones 
are among their coding schemes, origins of codes, and threats to trustworthiness. However, 
al of them interpret empirical text from a predominately naturalistic paradigm. The specific 
approach chosen varies with the theoretical and substantive interest and the problem being 
studied (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Weber 1990). As my research question is very deductive 
and the chosen theoretical framework provides from the outset a coding scheme, the option 
to select directed content analysis was quite clear. 
The goal of directed approach is to validate or extend conceptualy a theoretical framework 
or specific theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1281). Theory helps focusing the research 
question and provides predictions about the key concepts or variables and relationship 
between them. This helps determining the coding categories and the relationship between the 
diferent codes as the operational definitions of each category are determined using the 
theory. My coding scheme origins directly from the theory used - the three foreign policy 
types of Hans Morgenthau wil serve as the three key concepts and categories to identify 
what kind of foreign policy EU is implementing. As the theory predetermines the codes and 
their definitions, it enables me to start coding the empirical data immediately. If data has 
parts that cannot be coded through the initial codes, they must be identified and analyzed 
later to determine if a completely new category is needed or if they represent a subcategory 
of a exiting code (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282). In the case of this study, this would mean 
identification and separation of subcategories that mix diferent policy types, thus ensuring 
that the initial coding does not bias the identification of relevant text. For example, if some 
actions cannot be categorized directly as policy of prestige, subsequent analysis is needed to 
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determine if it is a mixture of policy of prestige and status quo or policy of prestige and 
imperialism. 
The way of introducing the findings of the content analysis can be done in multiple ways. 
The evidence can be presented by showing codes together with examples or through more 
descriptive evidence (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282). As every research should be 
trustworthy and thus repeatable for everyone doing research with the same scientific choices, 
in qualitative research the diferent research processes and analysis should always be 
explained thoroughly (Hirsijärvi et al. 2009, 231-233). The same applies to evidence of 
directed content analysis. Because the analysis is unlikely to result in coded data that 
provides for meaningful statistical comparisons, the use of rank order comparisons of 
frequency of codes can be applicable (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282-1283; Curtis et al. 
2001). In this research, describing the findings by presenting the frequency of the three 
foreign policy type-codes from Hans Morgenthau in detailed and descriptive manner is 
prefered. The theory wil further guide the discussion. If new categories are identified, they 
might later either refine the theory or show contradictory views of the phenomena (Hsieh 
and Shannon 2005, 1283). 
One of the major advantages of using directive content analysis, in addition to supporting 
and maybe extending the theory, is that as the knowledge in the research area grows the 
approach makes it unlikely that researchers work in naïve perspective (Hsieh and Shannon 
2005, 1283). However, the theory has its weaknesses as wel. According to Hsieh and 
Shannon, researchers are more likely to find more supportive than non-supportive evidence 
because they approach the data with informed but strong bias. Furthermore, overemphasis of 
the theory might blind researchers to the contextual sides of the phenomena (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005, 1283). Tuomi and Sarajärvi are, in addition, pointing out that even though 
content analysis enables the researchers to describe the analysis process wel, the 
conclusions often stay shalow and meaningless (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004). I am trying to 
avoid these aforementioned chalenges, not only by using the theory in more flexible way to 
draw conclusions, but also to tie the research later to the contemporary context of EU. 
1.4. Research in the context of international relations 
The European Union, its foreign and security policy in general and its development is a 
largely researched topic. The amount of researches and journals with an informative, school 
book-like approach to the EU, its foreign policy and its change is numerous (see e.g. Grevi, 
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Hely and Keohane 2009; Geabel 2011; Koehler 2010; Bonvicini and Comeli 2009). These 
studies focus on descriptively introducing the change in EU foreign policy doctrine, the 
impact of the Treaty of Lisbon and how it has provided and enabled more complex 
international activities to take place globaly, and strengthen EU as a security actor next to 
other actors. They provide extensive substantive background information of EU as an 
executive institution, its structure, foreign policy doctrines, resources and functions. 
However, as they focus merely on the institutional analysis of EU, they are able to answer 
the question of what EU can do, but the other important aspects – how and why – remain 
unanswered. In other words, these studies often lack the theoretical vision and capabilities to 
provide understanding for the motives, interests and aspirations of EU and to explain in-
depth what lies behind of EU’s global engagement and where it might lead. 
However, studies with an analytical and empirical perspective to EU, its foreign policy and 
global engagement exist to large extent as wel. Many researchers have, for example, 
analyzed EU, its foreign policy and expansion in EU as a normative power–frame (e.g. 
Manners 2002; Haukkala 2008; Haukkala and Ojanen 2002). EU’s presence in global arena 
and its military missions have, moreover, been analyzed in identity building and developing 
a political narative point of views as wel as something that is resulting from spil-over 
efect in definition of neofunctionalism (Inskanius 2008; Merit 2010; Tilikainen 1998). 
Popular aspect has also been to emphasize the influence of the changing global security 
environment to explain EU’s foreign policy and international actorness (Hass 2008; Van 
Lagenhove 2010). Even though these aforementioned researches and many other already 
possess the important empirical aspect as wel as theoretical vision, they al leave gaps 
within the curent research agenda. 
Explaining the variety of EU’s foreign policy functions, especialy EU’s engagement in 
global military missions solely with EU’s aspiration of projecting values and norms is not 
suficient in my opinion. The economic and security interest of certain missions is 
unavoidable and stressing the normative postulate of EU can obscure the other aspects and 
complicate capturing the object how it is instead of how it should be. Furthermore, identity 
building and developing political narratives–aspects, even though both important 
components of EU foreign policy development, ignore largely the significance of the 
recognition received from other international actors in order to gain power in relation to 
others to define oneself. The fact that political and security environment and its change have 
influence in defining foreign policy doctrines is self-evident. However, explaining EU’s 
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foreign policy, finding its embedded motivations in asserting bigger role as a global security 
actor and predicting the future paterns according which EU might act in the future and how 
those paterns might effect in the power distribution cannot be revealed through just 
analyzing global security environment, nor can it be done in the framework of 
neofunctionalism. 
Realism, however, can provide me with the means to answer my research question and to 
interpret EU’s interests behind its global security engagements. “For realism, theory consists 
in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character 
of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts 
performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus, we can find out what 
statesmen have actualy done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can 
surmise what their objectives might have been” (Morgenthau 1960, 5). Realism disregards 
the moral sentiments and considers the policy pursued to be explained and justified in 
ethical, legal or biological terms (Morgenthau 1960, 11). It also provides means to unravel 
this justification and find the embedded interests behind the action. 
As mentioned earlier, realism has been criticized for being dogmatic, having one-sided world 
view, hiding its own ideological premises and stressing the power aspect excessively 
(Hindrén 2007, 6-8). I consider it and its concept of struggle for power to be the best 
framework to capture the diferent aspects and motivations behind operation Atalanta, 
explain the action and give meaning to it in the larger context of EU foreign policy and its 
international power position. However, I wil try to use the theory in more flexible manner 
and thus alowing concepts to enter the researched political sphere that for Morgenthau 
would belong to other spheres not meaningful to tie to political research. Furthermore, I wil 
try to update the theory slightly to modern day in terms of not using the three foreign policy 
manifestations, their methods and objectives in such a rigid way that it would exclude 
aspects that are important for interpreting EU’s underlying ambitions in the present 
globalized and more unilateral world. 
As the use Hans Morgenthau’s theory as a basis of my thesis ties the research strongly to the 
tradition of political realism, and more specificaly to the tradition of classical realism, where 
the role of nation-state is emphasized and it is assumed that al actions of nation-states derive 
from national interests and lust for power. Power is a relative concept connected to the 
realistic conception of international system, which is anarchical. Al states, as rational actors, 
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pursue their own self-interest to defend themselves against the power of another state, and 
agreements with other states are enforced only to maintain desired international order and 
balance of power. Hence, for political realist, there is no authority over nation-state. (Ferraro 
2014; Toledo 2005.) 
Also Morgenthau uses his theory of diferent policy types when describing nation-states. 
However, since the international politics and nation-state domination in the global political 
arena has throughout the times transformed into more complex system, where political actors 
can, next to traditional states, be unions formed by diferent states, intergovernmental 
organizations or even non-governmental organizations, the realistic approach by Morgenthau 
and power relations between states, have been used as theoretical frame for many researches 
analyzing the political actions of something else than nation-state, like EU. In a sense, one 
could consider that the theory is this way brought to a present day. Indeed, even though EU 
is consisting out of multiple nation states, they have freely handed over some of their 
sovereignty to the EU Council and EU has legitimized and legaly binding power over the 
states in regard to some subjects. Furthermore, it does have a unanimously ratified foreign 
policy that it implements. Nevertheless, the research does not disregard the nation states and 
their private interest, but instead ties al of the aspects together at the end to create a more 
comprehensive whole. 
In recent years, there has been, in addition to al other research related to EU, a strong 
fashion to look EU through lenses of realism. Indeed, the evolution of EU’s foreign and 
security policy and its objectives, EU’s commitments and policies its pursues internationaly, 
politization of humanitarian interventions and mission selection have al been evaluated in 
the framework of political realism (Ali-Laurila 2005; Hyde-Price 2008; Jude 2012; Page 
2011; Romaniuk 2011, Wright 2011). Also Morgenthau and his theory introduced in Politics 
Among Nations have been used to bring theoretical depth to some of the researches. Despite 
al of this previous material, I stil consider there to be space left for my research. 
According to Chiara Ruffa, current debate assessing EU by realistic theoretical assumptions 
does not contribute too much to a beter understanding of EU foreign policy – empirical 
testing in the context of a case studies are needed to gain in-depth understanding of what 
kind of power EU is (Rufa 2011). It is indeed the case in with some of the aforementioned 
researches – some of them have either only a minor emphasis of the empirical analysis of 
specific cases or the theory is used only to orientate the study, not as a defining element. 
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Furthermore, the problematization of the research through theory differs from mine with 
many of the cases. In my research, the objective is since the beginning to combine both, 
theoretical and empirical aspects extensively through analyzing Operation Atalanta with the 
coding scheme given by Morgenthau to reveal what kind of power position EU is seeking. 
2. Politics among nations according to Morgenthau 
Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980) is considered to be one of the founding fathers of the 
realist school. He was born in Germany before the First World War and originaly studied 
law at University. Due to his Jewish background, he was forced to move around, first in 
Europe and then later to the USA. In the United States Morgenthau published his study 
Politics Among Nations: the Struggle of Power and Peace, which became an instant 
academic bestseler establishing the foundation of political realism. The book has been 
refered as a realist manifesto, landmark in the US literature of international relations and the 
prime statement of the realist approach to the study of international politics (Frei 2001; 
Guilhot 2012, 89; Gurian 1949). As a theoretical framework, realism has been shaped in the 
context of the Cold War times and used for understanding the post-Cold War world. Indeed, 
Morgenthau was the leading figures of the study of international politics during the Cold 
War and even acted as a consultant for the U.S. Department of State. His scientific work in 
the field of international politics after the Cold War and his legacy of realpolitik has received 
a lot of recognition. However, his earlier work before moving to the U.S., his intelectual 
legal formalist origins in the field of law that has strongly afected his later work, has not 
been studied as extensively (Ali-Laurila 2005; Jütersonke 2006). 
Morgenthau started developing his concept of power, theory of power-seeking nature of 
states and the three diferent foreign policy types; policy prestige, status quo and 
imperialism, long before political realism was founded. The separation of foreign policy 
types was first time mentioned in his study La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie des 
Diférends Internationaux published in 1933. In this publication Morgenthau analyzes power 
and lust for power in rather confrontational context of political and juridical questions (Ali-
Laurila 2005, 29). Lust for power is for him the psychological foundation of politics, and 
political action that reveals itself in social relations is always a demonstration of this lust 
(Morgenthau 1933; Palonen 2006). Person who does politics in general sense tries to either 
maintain the power that it already has and keep the curent state of politics static, or change 
the state of politics by increasing its power (Ali-Laurila 2005; Morgenthau 1933). In 
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addition, Morgenthau separates the third type (la politique de prestige), which he, however, 
does not yet connect to empirical analysis (Morgenthau 1933, 65). 
In foreign politics, the political decision-makers of states and their lust for power can 
represent a manifestation of one of these policy types. Furthermore, power for him is 
objective, and al states are either seeking to increase or keep it. Nonetheless, that in politics 
lust for power is recognized and understood; comprehensive legal system tries to objectively 
create limits for it. Legal norms create conditions for relations between states and within 
which the states can pursue power (Morgenthau 1933, 43-62). Legal structure should, 
furthermore, create a system where peaceful solutions are possible. Morgenthau’s thoughts 
should be interpreted in accordance with the time they were developed. After the First World 
War the League of Nations was established and especialy among the legal scholars there 
were a strong trust for its changes to replace the power politics–way of thinking (Ali-Laurila 
2005, 33). Struggle for power appears not as neutral in its definition in Morgenthau’s later 
publications. 
While in the La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie des Diférends Internationaux 
Morgenthau ponders the concept of power in foreign politics more in an international law 
context, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace is writen for political 
audience. Nevertheless, the legal aspect continues to effect subconsciously (Ali-Laurila 
2005, 28-36; Jütersonke 2006). Furthermore, there is a more explicit continuity with 
Morgenthau’s work from the times of La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie des Diférends 
Internationaux to Politics Among Nations - the lust for power, which is the basis of his 
theory, is considered to be typical for al human beings (Palonen 2005). However, only in 
Politics Among Nations Morgenthau wil finaly introduce the separation of al the three 
foreign policy types in detailed manner. In addition, the study is rather clear and more 
organized with practical examples than La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie des 
Diférends Internationaux thus making it easier to be used as the source of the theory for this 
thesis. 
As a true classic, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace gives a solid 
ground for the theoretical framework, since it is ever relevant for the field of international 
relations. However, it also presents a chalenge. The text of the book has been constantly 
evolving throughout the years due to its many editions. Al in al, Politics Among Nations 
has been edited seven times from which five times are done while Morgenthau was stil 
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living. Therefore, firstly I needed to ascertain which of these editions wil be the one to be 
used in this thesis. The first edition of the book, even though considered as a landmark, is 
stil missing the Six Principles of Political Realism. Therefore, it is not meaningful to use it. 
The second edition already contains the six principles. Despite this, I have decided to use the 
third edition published in 1960 paralel to the final edition from 2006. The reasoning for this, 
next to the fact that these versions were more accessible, is that the 1960 version already 
contains al the important parts of the publication and it has been revised by Morgenthau 
himself. In the 2006 edition on the other hand some historical examples not relevant 
anymore has been deleted and thus the edition is brought more to the present day 
(Morgenthau 2006, xii). However, as it has been revised after the death of Morgenthau, not 
by him but by Kenneth Thompson, I did not want to use it solely in case if it contains 
misinterpretations of Morgenthau. 
Some researchers are in the opinion that there are as many Morgenthaus as there are editions 
of the Politics Among Nations – from the early thoughts that established is position as the 
founding father of true political realism to the later revivals that tend to bring up the moral 
and ethical dimensions of his thought “destabilizing every notion of what constitutes 
realism” (Guilhot 2013, 69). I have rejected the idea that al the editions are so profoundly 
diferent from original thoughts of Morgenthau that using any edition would somehow 
compromise or endanger the results of this thesis. However, as a precaution I stil decided to 
include both, 1960 and 2006 editions to create depth in my thesis. I believe that using the 
1960 edition wil help me capture the original viewpoint of Morgenthau and the 2006 edition 
expands his thoughts further. With this method I do not need to compromise neither of these 
aspects. 
2.1. The concept of power 
International politics, like al politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate 
aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. (Morgenthau 
1960, 27.) 
Power and man’s lust for it are the core concepts for Morgenthau, his ontology. He places 
the power-lust at the center of human existence – it is timeless and universal. Everyone is 
after it and at the end al actions are merely a permanent struggle for it. Man is a political 
animal for Morgenthau by its nature and selfishness is one of our fundamental features. 
Firstly, power for Morgenthau was merely rooted in the need for survival. However, later it 
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turned into something that Morgenthau cals animus dominandi, the desire to dominate, and 
this desire is limitless (Schmidt 2007, 51). Power is man’s control over minds and actions of 
other men (Morgenthau 1960, 28). Therefore, as the man is born to seek power, their 
behavior and actions are always moving towards the power. 
The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics, 
as of al politics, international politics is of necessity power politics. (Morgenthau 
1960, 31.) 
And just as individuals, the goal of every state is to maximize its power. Despite the atempts 
to eliminate the struggle for power from the international scene through organizing the world 
with organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations, or creating false 
expectations of harmonious co-operation of mankind through science of peace that that is in 
2006 version of Politics Among Nations caled contemporary utopianism, it cannot be 
denied that states have throughout the times met and wil meet in the future each other in the 
contest of power (Morgenthau 1960, 32-35, Morgenthau 2006, 41). The reason for this is 
that the tendency to dominate is an embedded element of al human associations from every 
social level to the state (Morgenthau 1960, 34). The struggle for power is the essence of 
relations between states. Therefore, every activity of a state of political in nature 
internationaly is a continuous efort to maintain, increase or demonstrate power. These are 
the three basic paters of the struggle for power for Morgenthau. (Morgenthau 1960, 27-35). 
According to Morgenthau, the aforementioned three diferent political manifestations of 
struggle for power are always present in both domestic and international politics and every 
political phenomenon can be reduced into one of these three paterns. For these 
manifestations, three typical international policies corespond (Morgenthau 1960, 39). “A 
nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the 
distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose foreign 
policy aims at acquiring more power than it actualy has, through a reversal of existing 
power relations – whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power 
status – pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose foreign policy seeks to demonstrate 
the power it has cither for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it pursues a policy of 
prestige” (Morgenthau 1960, 39). The goals and interests of the state determine which type 
of foreign policy it practices. 
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However, the quest of power does not take place in a vacuum (Schmidt 2007, 51). The idea 
of interest defined as power as an objective but not changeless category is essential to 
Morgenthau’s realism. Morgenthau quotes Max Weber: “Interests (material and ideal), not 
ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the “images of the world” created by these 
ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of 
interests kept actions moving” (Morgenthau 1960, 9). The interests that define political 
actions at certain times are dependable of the current cultural and political context. The same 
applies to power – the present environment determines its content and how it can be used. In 
curent political and cultural context EU posing as a peaceful union has its limitations within 
it needs to formulate its foreign policy. Even though its interests would be imperialistic in a 
sense of pursuing power, the means of it is controled not only by the powers invested by its 
member states but also international law and present global political governance. 
Morgenthau has been criticized of providing only a single-variable structural explanation for 
international politics holding power as the main element defining it (Kaufman 2006, 24). 
This makes the theory static and unable to explain contemporary issues. According to Jack 
Donnely, power perceived by realists should be context-dependent and therefore linked with 
the cultural and political environment in which it has been formulated as wel as with the 
wide range of motives that drive the state’s behavior (Donnely 2000, 56). Therefore, to 
apply the theory to curent and more fluid environment we need not to exclude aspects that 
Morgenthau does not see as existing or belonging to the field of politics such as morality or 
economics from the reality that is been explored. Indeed, al competing even conflictive 
perspectives capture important aspects of world politics and help us making sense of the 
world. The theory of three foreign policy manifestations might not provide tools for deeper 
analysis of these aspects within his concept of interests defined as power but we can stil 
acknowledge them. And by acknowledging them we use them as bringing rationale to shed 
light to the underlying motivations of states in engaging in actions in the field of foreign 
politics. 
According to Morgenthau, power covers al social relationships from physical violence to 
psychological power over minds. In other words, it covers the domination of men over 
another in “western democracies” controled by moral and constitutional safeguards, but also 
in barbaric environment where the only limitations are its own strengths (Morgenthau 1960, 
9). In this sense, the power in present international context governed by the international law 
safeguards and cultural atmosphere that resents the violent, unjustified infringements of 
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sovereignty but highlights the importance of human being and human safety, military 
interventions and missions are proper channels to direct interest and power-lust through. But 
no mater how the interests wil be materialized – through divine intervention, natural 
development of human afairs, even non-political means such as technical cooperation 
between states – when states strive to realize their goals and interests by means of 
international politics, they are striving for power (Morgenthau 1960, 27). 
Morgenthau’s fundamental idea of connecting al the actions in the field of foreign politics to 
conscious and intentional pursue of power and holding moral and ethical notions of foreign 
politics only as a disguise to seek support to the actions has largely been criticized. 
According to Daniel Fiot, it is a common assumption to hold realism hostile towards actions 
basing on ethical considerations such as humanitarian interventions (Fiot 2013). Because 
these ethical functions are not generaly considered to be state’s tools to intentionaly seek 
influence over another but instead are basing on moral values of helping the ones in need, 
Morgenthau’s realism has seen as not been able to grasp a ful understanding of the 
contemporary politics. 
However, as described by Mihaela Neascu, in Morgenthau’s understanding “[m]an, 
perceived as a creature governed by antagonistic forces, is also a source of creation, causing 
positive changes by means of his longing for transcendence” (Neascu 2010, 62). Therefore, 
it can be seen that the theory is more complex than generaly perceived. Indeed, primarily 
Morgenthau sees moralism to be a disguise for pursue of power. But he also notes that “not 
every action that performs with respect to another nation is of political in nature” 
(Morgenthau 1960, 27-28). A state can therefore engage in actions such as legal, economic 
and humanitarian without afecting on power relations, however, in these cases the actions 
are not within the sphere of politics. I, on the other hand, alow these aspects to enter the 
political sphere and this research and wil primarily hold them as part of struggling for 
power. However, if seen that they do not contribute to the notion of power, they are not 
neglected but used as a competitive aspects creating larger understanding of the topic of 
launching Operation Atalanta. 
For Morgenthau, next to understanding the fundamental nature of power, strive for it and the 
three manifestations of struggle for power, it is also important to separate why some states 
have power over another. The states actions can have an impact due to three reasons: the 
expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages and the respect or love for men or 
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institutions (Morgenthau 2006, 31). According to him, the expectation of benefits and fear of 
disadvantages are commonly quite wel acknowledged and they can include anything 
between economic advantages or sanctions to positive or negative publicity. The respect for 
an institution is less obvious, but in not less important factor. When an institution has 
charisma it is easier for it to also achieve political power. Morgenthau uses United States 
government and Constitution as an example. Charismatic institution evokes trust through 
which men or in this case states can submit themselves to the wils of it. (Morgenthau 2006, 
31.) 
In addition to separating the reasons why some have power over another, Morgenthau also 
makes distinctions between power and influence, power and force, usable and unusable 
power, and legitimate and ilegitimate power. Al of these distinctions have an important 
meaning for understanding the concept of political power. Influence difers from power 
according to Morgenthau by its definition: a person that has influence over another can effect 
on the decisions of the other person. However, it cannot impose its own wil upon the other. 
In contrast, the person that has power can impose its wil upon the other by using the 
promise of benefits or threat of disadvantages. (Morgenthau 2006, 30.) 
Furthermore, the political power needs to be distinguished from force in the sense of 
physical violence. Even though Morgenthau considers the threat of physical violence as an 
inherent part of international politics, the actualization of it wil transform the political power 
into military power. However, the threat or a potentiality of force is an important factor 
contributing to the political power of another state over another (Morgenthau 2006, 30). 
Morgenthau uses nuclear weapons as an example to demonstrate the diference between 
usable and unusable power. A threat of nuclear weapons can be a suitable instrument in 
foreign politics against a country without access to nuclear material. However, already 
during the times Morgenthau wrote his first edition of Politics Among Nations, it was 
apparent that increase in military power is not necessary conducive for political power, 
especialy not when the counterpart can reply to the threat with similar manner (Morgenthau 
2006, 30). In such case the mutual threats cancel each other out. What makes this ilustration 
a good example of unusable power is, however, its irational aspect. Realism assumes that 
the states act rationaly within the frames of its knowledge. It is therefore very unlikely that 
it would be in state’s interest to actualy engage in nuclear war in al of its magnitude of 
destructiveness to change someone’s wil. Hence, it can be categorized as unusable power. In 
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contrast, conventional force can be seen as usable instrument of foreign policy due to its 
capacity to inflict limited damage with wel-portioned risks to oneself and thus be suitable to 
use to persuade others to change their wil (Morgenthau 2006, 30). 
Lastly, Morgenthau separates ilegitimate power from power whose exercise is moraly or 
legaly justified. This separation is important because political power is easier to atain and it 
is more efective in regard to influencing the wil of others when its exercise has legitimate 
justification. Morgenthau gives an example of power exercised in self-defense or in the name 
of United Nations. This power has beter chances to succeed compared to power used in 
violation of international law. (Morgenthau 2006, 30-31). 
Between the lines the reader can acknowledge Morgenthau’s legal background. However, 
even though the cultural and political conditions in which the diferent foreign policy types 
operate also includes international law, Morgenthau did not believe that the instability of the 
world can be changed. On the contrary, he did not believe on higher order bringing peace 
among nations. Interests, on which actions must be judged, are product of history and wil 
therefore also disappear in the history (Morgenthau 1960, 10). Even though for Morgenthau 
“[n]othing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of 
the political world into nation-states wil be replaced by larger units of a quite diferent 
character, more in keeping with the technological potentialities and the moral requirements 
of the contemporary world”, he did not believe that we can transform the political reality 
with its own laws, i.e. the power-lust, with an ideal that does not take the every nation-state’s 
quintessential need for power into account (Morgenthau 1960, 10). This idea does not argue 
with my thoughts. As we see, the world stil have its disputes and power is pursued 
sometimes in a more violent, sometimes more peaceful ways. However, in the present 
multilateral context the EU as a union of democratic countries is tied to pursue power more 
peacefuly. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the thought that it is striving for power, either 
for status quo, imperialism or prestige. 
2.2. Policy of status quo 
As the three manifestations of the struggle for power and the foreign policy types that 
corespond with them are the main theoretical points of reference for my thesis, it is 
necessary to introduce al of them in more detailed manner. When al the actions of EU in 
foreign policy scene are struggle for power, but this struggle can have three diferent forms 
and aims, it is necessary to recognize what makes these manifestations of power 
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fundamentaly diferent. This enables us to identify the foreign policy patern EU is presently 
pursuing, comprehend the forces and interests that determine its behavior and predict where 
this practice of this specific foreign policy type might lead in the context of distribution of 
powers globaly. 
The first foreign policy type that defines politics among nations is policy of status quo. For 
Morgenthau, a state that practices policy of status quo is pursuing to keep the power that it 
already has. Consequently, the aim of policy of status quo is “the maintenance of the 
distribution of power which exists in particular moment in history” (Morgenthau 1960, 40). 
The title of the concept derives from status quo ante belum, which is a diplomatic term 
implying to the return of distribution of power after the war (Morgenthau 1960, 39-40). 
Indeed, when introducing the policy of status quo, Morgenthau refers in particular to 
diferent peace treaties. For him the specific moment in history serving as a point of 
reference to policy status quo is, in fact, often the end of war when distribution of powers 
has been codified in a peace treaty. 
But it is not merely peace treaties that can function as the point of reference for policy of 
status quo. After every power shift, no mater if resulting from violent war or more peaceful 
power struggle, formulation of either new legal terms or political conceptions is necessary to 
ensure the new distribution of power (Morgenthau 1960, 40). Morgenthau is mainly writing 
in terms of legal stipulations, but as the times of the more violent wars and creations of peace 
treaties has more or less passed in western world and more soft and diplomatic ways of 
demonstrating power and causing shifts in power structures have emerged, it is just a mater 
of updating the theory slightly to acknowledge the role of political recognition. Therefore, I 
would say that the reference point for policy of status quo would not need to be a specific 
peace or aliance treaty but it can also be a certain politicaly acknowledged status or power 
equilibrium. 
Furthermore, even though the goal of policy of status quo is to maintain the power structures 
of certain historical reference point, the policy does not necessarily oppose al changes. The 
important criterion is merely that the general power balance stays stable. Therefore, minor 
adjustments on the distribution of power are not relevant to the point that the relative power 
positions among nations stay undisturbed. Morgenthau ilustrates this with an example from 
1971, where United States acquired the Virgin Islands from Denmark. Even though this 
procurement improved the strategic position of United States in the context of Caribbean, it 
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did not change the relative power position. Instead, it merely strengthened US power 
domination and was consequently compatible with the objectives of status quo policy. 
(Morgenthau 1960, 43; Morgenthau 2006, 55.) 
2.3. Policy of imperialism 
Morgenthau begins his introduction of imperialism by defining what imperialism is not. He 
refers to the widespread and indiscriminate “arbitrary” use of imperialism to describe 
particular type of foreign policy that is opposed, in which the real meaning of imperialism as 
an objective foreign policy type has lost its concrete meaning. Every foreign policy that is 
disapproved and discredited could in present terms be falsely caled imperialistic. Therefore, 
it is important for theoretical analysis to break this patern and define the term objectively to 
give it a neutral meaning that can later be applied to both theory and practice of international 
relations. (Morgenthau 2006, 56-57.) 
Morgenthau separates the three most common misconceptions of imperialism. The first one 
was disclosed already in discussion with status quo. Not every foreign policy aiming to 
increase the power of a nation, represent imperialism. As status quo does not oppose al 
changes a policy aiming to minor increase of power, can stil operate within its frame. As 
long as the policy does not aim to change the power distribution or overthrow the status quo, 
it is not by necessity imperialistic. Secondly, the common misconception is to consider 
preservation of an empire as an example of imperialism although the aim would only be to 
maintain, stabilize and defense the power. Thus, the imperialism becomes identified with 
features of policy of status quo as the objective of the struggle for power is not to acquire 
empire but to consolidate it. Lastly, Morgenthau connects false misconceptions of 
imperialism to the economic theories of it. (Morgenthau 2006, 57-58.) 
This economic connotation gave rise to the most extensive, most systematic, and 
also most popular body of thought which has sought to explain imperialism in 
modern times: the economic theories of imperialism. Here we find the third of the 
misconceptions that have obscured the true nature of imperialism. (Morgenthau 
2006, 59.) 
According to Morgenthau, the fundamental meaning of policy of imperialism does not imply 
to the economic theories consisting out of Marxist, Liberal and the “Devil” theories that 
holds economic forces and economic interests as the source of al imperialistic political 
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phenomena. Devil theories for Morgenthau mean imperialistic state’s aspiration for 
teritorial conquest in military means resulting on economic gains thus labeling the state as 
the “enemy” or “devil” (Ali-Laurila 2005, 41; Morgenthau 2006, 59). The reason why the 
explanation of imperialism according to these theories is not plausible is that it fails to test 
the historic experience (Morgenthau 1960, 49). For Morgenthau, no war has been waged by 
exclusively for economic objectives. Victory of wars might bring economic advantages, but 
he sees them more as by-products of the political consequences. Therefore, as the objective 
is to atain power, political needs to be held primary over economics (Morgenthau 2006, 61-
62). 
Then, what is policy of imperialism for Morgenthau? It is struggle for power that aims to 
overthrow the present power distribution, the status quo. Morgenthau separates three 
diferent situations, where the policy is most likely to occur, and three diferent typical aims 
for it to help us beter recognize the conditions which favor or produce imperialistic policy. 
Victorious war, lost war and existence of weak states or politicaly empty spaces are ideal for 
favoring of imperialistic foreign policy. When a nation is engaged in a war, it is most likely 
that the nation is pursuing to change the distribution of power between it and defeated 
enemy, i.e. practicing imperialistic foreign policy. The more favorable status quo for 
victorious state of the war acquired through the policy of imperialism wil, however, most 
likely cal forth policy of imperialism on the counter-part. The overthrown nation wil 
plausibly want to regain the lost power and therefore it might pursue policy of imperialism 
later on. Also existence of weak states and political empty spaces encourages pursuing 
imperialistic policy because they are atractive and more accessible for strong and powerful 
states. According to Morgenthau, this was the case in which colonial imperialism gained its 
popularity. (Morgenthau 1960, 54-55.) 
The three objectives that policy of imperialism is most likely to pursue are world empire, 
continental empire and local preponderance. World empire could be seen as a synonym for 
super power. In other words, state with an imperialistic foreign policy could pursue 
dominant position characterized with influence and ability to exert power in a global scale. 
State that pursues continental empire is seeking to dominate certain continent or its localized 
parts. Here the geographical limits of the continent wil set boundaries to the imperialism. 
State that is seeking local preponderance with its imperialistic foreign policy wil, in 
contrast, set its own subjective limits for domination. In this case, it is not tied to strict 
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geographic limits but to limits defined by objective facts beyond which it could be either 
technicaly dificult or politicaly unwise to go. (Morgenthau 1960, 55-58). 
In addition to previous, Morgenthau separates also the three typical means of policy of 
imperialism. Accordingly, he distinguishes between military, economic and cultural 
imperialism. 
In truth, military imperialism seeks military conquest; economic imperialism, 
economic exploitation of other peoples; cultural imperialism, the displacement of 
one culture by another — but always as means to the same imperialistic end. That 
end is always the overthrow of the status quo: that is, the reversal of the power 
relations between the imperialist nation and its prospective victims. (Morgenthau 
1960, 58.) 
Morgenthau sees the military imperialism as the fastest method to reach one’s goal and atain 
power domination over the vanquished nation. However, no domination can last if it is 
founded upon merely military force. Economic imperialism is generaly the less efective, 
but nonetheless more rational, method of gaining power compared to military imperialism. It 
is a product of modern times that enables conquering teritories fairly and indirectly by way 
of economic control. Morgenthau points out that economic imperialism needs to be 
separated from imperialism of economic theories; on the contrary to the later one, economic 
imperialism is only interested in the economic power and exploitation over other nations not 
occupying actual geographical teritories. The last one, cultural imperialism, is according to 
Morgenthau the most subtle and successful if it only would have the capabilities to succeed 
alone. It aims to conquer the minds of men as an instrument of changing the power relations. 
However, it generaly fals short in its abilities and therefore needs the assistance of the other 
two. (Morgenthau 2006, 42-44.) 
Indeed, al the methods can be used in combination to pursue power. Cultural imperialism 
usualy is used to support military and economic imperialism. In similar manner, also 
economic imperialism can play supportive role to military imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 
44). When puting these methods to present frame of international politics and relations 
between nations, it is easy to acknowledge why they need support from each other. The 
present general opinion does not see military imperialism that is pursued openly and in a 
large scale without legitimate reason as a rational instrument of foreign policy. 
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2.4. Policy of prestige 
Even though mentioned already in 1933 in La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie des 
Diférends Internationaux, Morgenthau introduces the third manifestation of struggle for 
power in international scene, policy of prestige, first time in detail with examples in Politics 
Among Nations. Policy of prestige is at its fundamental nature an intrinsic element of 
relations between nations. Every nation has a desire for recognition, and this recognition 
serves as a dynamic force in determining our place in society. “It is only the tribute others 
pay to his goodness, inteligence, and power that he becomes fuly aware of, and can fuly 
enjoy, what he deems to be his superior qualities” (Morgenthau 1960, 73). The purpose of it 
is to impress other nations with the power that it wants them to believe it possesses. The 
reputation, mental picture and prestige drawn are exactly the factors that the nation can gain 
the security, power and wealth it desires. Prestige can be seen as the most expedient for 
foreign policy seeking not only to increase the reputation of power but also the substance of 
it (Morgenthau 2006, 91). 
Policy of prestige has, according to Morgenthau, two main objectives: prestige for its own 
sake and prestige to support the other two manifestations of struggle for power – imperialism 
and status quo. While prestige for its own sake is not as common, one should not neglect the 
meaning of it. Despite that it is rarely the main objective of foreign policy, demonstrating 
power is important for states that rely upon their own protection in international scene – loss 
of prestige can have damaging influences on their power position. This “negative policy of 
prestige” can lead to another state to test it in practice and actual loss of power. However, 
one should always remember that seeking prestige for its own sake is a two-headed sword, 
the exaggerated prestige, i.e. the bluf, can lead to mistakes and be revealed or even worse, 
be put to test and lead to loss of al the power. (Morgenthau 2006, 91-95.) 
The function the policy of prestige fulfils for the policies of the status quo and of 
imperialism grows out of the very nature of international politics. The foreign 
policy of a nation is always the result of an estimate of the power relations as they 
exist among diferent nations at a certain moment of history and as they are likely to 
develop in the immediate and distant future. (Morgenthau 1960, 80.) 
Rational foreign policies are always based upon the beliefs of power distribution. Policy of 
prestige’s aim is to efect on these beliefs. Morgenthau, for example, explains the relative 
stability of European continent in twenties with the prestige of France as the strongest 
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military power (Morgenthau 2006, 91). Hence, no other state wanted to chalenge it. If 
France would have had the policy objective of status quo, the prestige possessed enabled it to 
hold on the power balance. In other words, no mater of the state’s ultimate foreign policy 
objectives, the prestige as the reputation of power, is determinant in its success (Morgenthau 
1960, 80). Prestige is an important weapon in the struggle over the minds and reputation of 
performance and power might exactly be the decisive factors on which other nations base 
their actions towards others. 
Prestige has demonstrated itself as a vital part of a rational foreign policy. Nevertheless, it 
has been neglected for long in the field of international relations. Morgenthau gives rather 
many examples of why, but most importantly because of its equation with the aristocratic 
and sometimes absurd practices of the diplomatic world (Morgenthau 2006, 84). Indeed one 
of the two instrumentalities serving policy of prestige is the diplomatic ceremonial. In short, 
it means the ceremonial forms between political elites ilustrating the power relations 
between nations. The respect shown in these ceremonies symbolizes the true respect among 
the nations (Morgenthau 1960, 74). Examples Morgenthau gives are the preposterous ones 
and from time to time slightly outdated. However, diplomatic ceremonials as instrument of 
prestige can also be put to a present context. Presently, for example invites to meaningful 
conferences and meetings between important policy-makers, internationaly disregarded 
diplomatic statements and so forth can symbolize the respect given to certain countries and 
work as an instrument for prestige. 
The second instrument serving towards policy of prestige is the display of military force. As 
the strength of military is often seen as the equation of the power of the nation, policy of 
prestige can indeed use demonstration of military as means to achieve its goals and impress 
others (Morgenthau 2006, 90). Morgenthau uses military visits, displays and even partial or 
total military mobilizations as examples of this type of ilustration of power. Here the 
reputation of power works both as deterent and preparation of war. Hence, the reputation – 
policy of prestige – is able to endorse and support for both status quo and imperialistic 
policies. 
3. Analyzing Atalanta 
This chapter is devoted to analyzing the primary material through the lenses of 
Morgenthau’s three manifestations of struggle for power by using the directed content 
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analysis. As explained before, the directed content analysis uses the coding schemes 
generated by theory. Therefore, the theory wil bring both structure and meaning for the 
findings of the analysis. In other words, the three policy types of Morgenthau provides not 
only the analysis categories and their operational definitions that enables the identification 
and structuring of the relevant parts of the text but also gives a formula through which I can 
understand and explain the findings. 
I have decided to divide this chapter into four diferent subchapters according to the different 
themes emerging from the primary material. The main reason for using this kind of 
structuring instead of just dividing the chapters into the three policy types used for the 
coding of the material is unambiguous: even though the material is analyzed with an 
objective of recognizing which of these policy types is EU implementing through rank order 
comparisons of frequency, dividing the findings only into three categories omits some of the 
important data that cannot be categorized strictly into only one of these three as the diferent 
policy types are not always mutualy exclusive. Therefore, it was rather meaningful to 
separate the four different themes defining Operation Atalanta and its methods of action, and 
use the theory to describe these findings of the analysis and recognize which policy types or 
combinations they represent. The themes are the launch of the operation as the window of 
opportunity for struggle for power, the evolving mandate expanding EU’s sphere of 
activities as wel as the geographical zone, seeking visibility and recognition as one of the 
main methods of the operation, and cooperation and EU’s actions towards positioning itself 
next to other big security actors. 
3.1. Launch – the window of opportunity 
In resolution 1816 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 2 June 2008, the 
UN Security Council expressed its concern at the threat that acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and efective delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and 
international navigation. […] It authorised, for a period of six months from the date 
of the resolution, States cooperating with the TFG […] to enter the territorial waters 
of Somalia and to use, in a manner consistent with relevant international law, al 
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. (EU Council1.) 
The European Union shal conduct a military coordination action in support of UN 
Security Council resolution 1816 (2008), named EU NAVCO. (EU Council1.) 
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For Morgenthau al actions in the field of foreign politics are struggling for power – power 
for prestige, status quo or imperialism. Therefore, when EU decided to launch operation EU 
NAVCO, the predecessor of Operation Atalanta leading to its the launch a few months later, 
after many individual countries as wel as NATO and US-led CMF had already been 
working on the Gulf of Aden and Somali coast protecting vessels against piracy for some 
time cannot be seen as anything else than an atempt to struggle for power in an international 
arena. However, the question rises why now and why this operation? EU has had many 
opportunities to increase, stabilize or show of power throughout the past decade. There have 
been many moments where it could have responded to international crisis and positioned 
itself as an international security actor. So why did it choose specificaly this region and this 
specific moment for its wakening? 
The general background together with the Council Joint Actions establishing first the 
Operation EU NAVCO and then less than three months later Operation Atalanta give 
clearance to the aforementioned questions. Operations were the window of opportunity for 
EU’s struggle for power. Somalia is often caled the failed state (Larik 2013, 1). The lack of 
an efective government as wel as the renewed armed conflicts and severe drought, erosion 
of fish stock and famine have acted as a launch pad and fertile breeding ground for piracy. In 
mid-2008, after increasing piracy atacks, the United Nations decided to finaly adopt 
Security Council resolution to urge countries to take actions against piracy. This resolution 
together with the region being weak and in a spotlight of atention served as a great 
opportunity for EU to finaly acquire power and increase its visibility. 
In its Resolution 1838 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, the UNSC commended 
the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union (EU) naval 
operation, as wel as other initiatives taken with a view to implement Resolutions 
1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008), and urged States that have capacity to do so, to 
cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea in 
conformity with the provisions of Resolution 1816 (2008). (EU Council2.) 
Morgenthau separates legitimate power from ilegitimate when explaining why some 
countries have power over another as explained on section 2.1. For him legitimate power 
invoked by moral or legal justification is more efective for acquiring power in struggle than 
ilegitimate (Morgenthau 2006, 30). Therefore, launching the operation after it has been 
encouraged and legitimized by the United Nations is more functional tool in its struggle for 
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power whereas if it would have been launched in ofensive manner without justification. 
Even though piracy has been going on for years, the United Nations resolution could be seen 
as the last push for EU to mobilize its military capacities. For acquiring more power and 
through it shifting or stabilizing the distribution of power would face more resistance if it 
would not display as a responding to the cal from UN. 
On 15 September 2008, the Council reafirmed its serious concern at the acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, deploring, in particular, their recent 
resurgence. (EU Council2.) 
The European Union (EU) shal conduct a military operation in support of 
Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) […] hereinafter caled ‘Atalanta’. (EU Council2.) 
However, the legitimatization cannot solely explain EU’s engagement. According to 
Romaniuk, EU has demonstrated its ambitions to play global role for a long time already. 
Nevertheless, one of its major chalenges has been to overcome the general conception that it 
is not only afraid to use military force, but also is generaly powerless to use it beyond its 
borders (Romaniuk 2011, 10-13). For EU, therefore, to demonstrate that it in fact can and is 
wiling to act internationaly and be credible while doing that, it needs a solid base to do this. 
In addition of geting the legitimation for its actions Gulf of Somalia, as a region raising 
serious concerns as writen in Council Joint Action quoted above, displays as an easy target 
for EU to demonstrate its ability and wilingness to address international security threats on 
international arena by military means. Morgenthau identifies one of the breeding grounds for 
state’s imperialism to be the existence of a weak state and empty spaces (Morgenthau 1960, 
55). 
It is self-evident, that Somalia can be considered as weak state atractive for easy struggle for 
power and increasing one’s power. The “need for wider participation by international 
community” and the “concern at the upsurge of piracy atacks” pose as a power vacuums 
caling upon someone to take over (EU Council2). As portrayed by Larik, the operation was 
born out of favorable situation and represented more manageable chalenge to EU compared 
to other international chalenges (Larik 2013, 6). However, it cannot be unequivocaly seen 
as an empty space since there were already naval missions securing the vessels. Therefore, 
there are two possibilities for EU’s ambitions: either its objective was to, by chalenging 
NATO and United States led CMF, to increase its power position at their expenses and 
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thereby shift the power structures drasticaly, or demonstrate its own power and receive 
recognition, prestige and this way equate itself next to the big international security players. 
According to Morgenthau, the later does not constitute as imperialism, since it does not aim 
to overthrow the status quo but make adjustments (Morgenthau 1960, 45). 
Indeed, the EU, instead of taking the lead, stresses in the Council Joint Action establishing 
Operation Atalanta the cooperation with other actors. The Combined Task Force 150, U.S. 
led mission joined by some EU countries like UK, Denmark, France and Germany, is 
explicitly mentioned as entities to liaise with. Furthermore, Council Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on the Operation Atalanta authorizes the release of classified information 
and documents of the Operation Atalanta in the name of cooperation (EU Council2). 
Accordingly, it cannot be shown that EU was trying to overthrow the power of the previous 
operations but instead work and position itself next to them. 
One could ask if EU was not trying to overthrow the curent power positions, could the 
launch of the operation then be considered as an act of policy of status quo? The answer is 
yes in one sense, since status quo, even though aims to the maintenance of curent power 
distribution, does not oppose al changes (Morgenthau 1960, 42). Also a second fact 
supports the status quo statement. For Morgenthau expectations of benefits and fear of 
disadvantages form basis for domestic politics, but also have major impact on international 
politics (Morgenthau 2006, 33-34). Not launching the Operation Atalanta even though the 
increasing piracy and UN Security Council’s requests for actions could have served as a 
major disadvantage for EU’s power position in international scene. 
The situation in the Gulf of Somalia, the piracy and kidnappings enjoyed large media 
coverage internationaly. According to Germond and Smith, as the piracy is highly 
publicized, states are forced out to demonstrate that they are, in fact, doing something to 
prevent piracy and help kidnapped citizens (Germond and Smith 2009, 580). Furthermore, 
from EU member states there were already some, including France, Netherlands and 
Denmark, operating against piracy at the area. It is commonly known that the member 
countries possess the capacity to respond to security threats. However, as in many times 
before, EU as a whole has not been able to unite its member states and be coherent to take 
actions, but instead member countries have had to do that in their national capacity. This has 
been proven many times with multiple crisis situations (Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009). Indeed, 
even though EU has established its international security dimension with clear wilingness to 
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be a global actor, one of its major criticisms has been its inability to coordinate its various 
resources (Germond and Smith 2009, 574). Therefore, launching the operation would not 
only prove its abilities to project power but also prevent it losing its credibility as 
international actor completely. Consequently, the launch served as benefit bringing prestige 
and visibility to its global actorness as wel as countering losing the litle power it has 
acquired with responding some crisis situations, i.e. maintaining the status quo. 
This was the first engagement a EUNAVFOR vessel has been involved since 
Operation Atalanta was launched 2 weeks ago, and demonstrates how good 
communication combined with prompt and robust action can thwart piracy atacks. 
(EU NAVFOR 27.12.2008.) 
Indeed, the launch of the operation served as launch pad for fast and relatively easy prestige. 
For Morgenthau foreign policy is always a result of an estimation of one’s power and the 
primary function of policy of prestige is to influence on this estimation (Morgenthau 2006, 
91). Somalia has been troubled for decades and no-one expected the naval missions launched 
under UN resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 to solve the underlying reasons for piracy and 
stop it completely. The main goal was to protect “vessels of the WFP delivering food aid” 
and “vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast” (EU Council2). According to 
Romaniuk, certainly question whether EU is seeking to employ its military force 
increasingly in areas where it is certain to achieve its desired goals should be asked. 
Commiting in global arena has become critical to EU’s strategic future and robust force 
deployability and short-term successes are critical indicators of its power as a security actor 
(Romaniuk 2011, 17-28). Operation Atalanta enabled robust and largely published successes 
in preventing atacks, which then had a fast efect on the estimations of EU’s power as 
global security actor. 
The forces deployed to that end shal operate, up to 500 nautical miles of the 
Somali coast and neighbouring countries, in accordance with the political objective 
of an EU maritime operation […]. (EU Council2.) 
Under the conditions set by the relevant international law and by UNSC Resolutions 
1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), Atalanta shal, as far as available 
capabilities alow: […] take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to 
deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed 
robbery […]. (EU Council2.) 
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Finaly, to be able to explain and understand EU foreign policy projected in the launch of 
Atalanta, a military operation taking place outside the EU teritory, we must look at the 
curent political situation together with EU’s reputation as powerless entity to use its military 
capacity beyond its borders. According to Morgenthau, the interests that define political 
actions at certain times are dependable of the current cultural and political context. The same 
applies to power – the present environment determines its content and how it can be used 
(Morgenthau 2006, 9). For policy of prestige, the display of military force and partial or total 
military mobilizations are important demonstrations that serve to impress others with one’s 
power (Morgenthau 2006, 90-91). However, in a present world waging war or plainly 
displaying military force close to other sovereign state’s teritory without justification cannot 
be seen as acceptable way of trying to increase or display power. The interests and the 
manner of using and demonstrating power need to be put to the present political and cultural 
framework. EU as a peaceful union has limitations within it needs to operate when 
displaying its military power. 
The aforementioned limitation created by the current environment is linked also to 
Morgenthau’s idea of usable and unusable power. As mentioned earlier, Morgenthau uses 
nuclear weapons as an example of unusable power as its use is more destructive compared to 
its benefits (Morgenthau 2006, 30). However, in a present environment also display of 
military force and partial mobilization of it could be seen unusable as without a proper 
legitimization it actualy harms one’s international reputation rather than bring advantages. 
Therefore, the situation in the Gulf of Somalia, the protection of the vessels delivering 
humanitarian aid through military means, and the legitimization from UN serve as a 
justification for EU to display its military capacity and abilities to rapid and efective 
deployment. For realists, politics subordinate morality and represent mean to atain and 
justify power (Griffits 1999, 37). Morgenthau does not separate unjust and just war since the 
humanitarianism as a justification to deploy military force is nothing else than means for 
political leaders (Jude 2012, 42; Koskenniemi 2002, 451). For him “the true nature of the 
policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations” (Morgenthau 1960, 
86). Consequently, the true need for military protection for vessels delivering humanitarian 
aid and UN legitimization finaly enabled EU to display its military capacities, to project 
power and use Operation Atalanta as important benchmark for its credibility as a global 
actor. 
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3.2. Evolving mandate – from humanitarianism to comprehensive approach 
The previous subchapter analyzed the launch of the Operation Atalanta and the objectives 
behind it. In this subchapter I am going to concentrate on the evolving mandate of the 
operation – what does the change tel us about EU foreign policy, its goals and objectives? 
Operation Atalanta has been extended three times since its launch – in 2009, 2010 and latest 
in 2012 (EU Council5; EU Council7; EU Council10). The operation that was first planned to 
last only 12 months is now terminating 12 December 2014. Furthermore, the operation has 
been extended in regard of its scope of responsibilities and the geographic area that it covers, 
as wel. In 2009 monitoring of fishing activities was added to Atalanta’s activity list (EU 
Council5). In March 2010 the EU member states were given an authorization to inspect 
cargo to and from Somalia if there is a reason to suspect that the cargo may include material 
violating the arms embargo established in United Nations Security Council resolution 733 in 
1992. Also, the member states shal colect identification data such as fingerprints and 
equipment used from pirates for international cooperation purposes (EU Council6). Lastly, 
in 2012 the Council decided to extend the force area to include Somali coastal as wel as 
teritorial and internal waters and land territory to the scope (EU Council10). 
In addition, to extending the actual scope of the operation EU has adopted a Strategic 
Framework in regard to Horn of Africa extending its activities even further. It appointed an 
EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, focusing mainly to Somalia and the 
regional dimension of the conflict and piracy (EU Council8). In 2010, the EU started a 
military training mission EUTM in Somalia aiming, by providing military training to the 
Somali National Armed Force, to strengthen the Somali National Government. In 2012, EU 
regional capacity building mission EUCAP NESTOR was launched under Common Security 
and Defence Policy to assist the Horn of Africa and West Indian Ocean countries to enhance 
their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance through 
reinforcing coast guard functions, supporting the rule of law and, in Somalia, assisting in the 
development of a coastal police. Together with Operation Atalanta, these missions are aimed 
to contribute for the EU Strategic Framework. 
The Council noted that the Operation ATALANTA had demonstrated its ability to 
act effectively against piracy, that piracy of the coast of Somalia was likely to 
remain threat beyond Operation ATALANTA’s curent end date […] and that early 
agreement on extending the operation would facilitate the force generation. In this 
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context, the Council agreed that Operation ATALANTA should be extended for one 
year from its curent date. (EU Council4.) 
As was explained in previous subchapter the EU needed the legitimization from UN as wel 
as the right disguise, the protection of the vessels delivering humanitarian aid through 
military means, to deploy and display its military force. EU was already able to demonstrate 
that it indeed can and is wiling to launch a robust mission and deploy troops to the troubled 
areas. Furthermore, it was able to accomplish its required tasks and “demonstrate its ability 
to prevent piracy”. Timely extension is surely justified, since piracy was and is nowhere 
close to disappear and protection of vessels was stil needed – terminating the mission would 
therefore send a wrong message of EU’s motivation and persistence to act as an international 
player. Furthermore, EU was managing wel operationaly and succeeding generaly. 
However, why to expand and add both responsibilities and more geographic area for the 
mission to perform and execute? What foreign policy type does that embody and which 
objectives does it serve? 
The EU’s first maritime operation to protect the World Food Programme and 
vulnerable ships from piracy is a grand success. (EU NAVFOR 2.9.2009.) 
We are extremely pleased with the continued success of the EU NAVFOR 
(Somalia) anti piracy operation. (EU NAVFOR 9.10.2009.) 
I very much enjoyed my tour of EU NAVFOR’s Operational Headquarters and was 
extremely impressed with the professionalism and cooperation of so many 
participating EU Member States military personnel, as wel as the close working 
relationship with the representatives of the civilian maritime organisations. 
Operation Atalanta has achieved a great deal in its first year and there is every 
indication from what I have seen that the second year wil be as successful if not 
more so. (EU NAVFOR 19.1.2010.) 
Operation NAVFOR-Atalanta is a flagship of excelence in EU cooperation in 
security and defence. (EU NAVFOR 19.4.2010.) 
During the launch of the operation, only the humanitarian and protective side of the 
operation was articulated – the goal was to protect vulnerable and WFP vessels delivering 
food aid. In Morgenthau’s words, the objective of the political leaders was wearing a 
disguise and the overal foreign policy was presented in terms of philosophic and political 
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sympathies to gain support, justification and legitimization for it (Morgenthau 2006, 6). EU 
was trying to struggle for prestige as its foreign and military capacities were under-
evaluated. Protecting vessels via heavily equipped and extensively trained naval forces 
against often untrained and young pirates seems like a manageable task even when 
considering the vast geographic area to be covered and EU was indeed succeeding with it. In 
this light, it is easy to see why EU was not pointing out or indicating anything towards 
solving the more complex problem of piracy from the beginning. As it was only aiming for 
fast and easy recognition – prestige – it needed a chalenge it has capacities to manage. 
According to Jennifer Welsh, humanitarian interventions always hold strategic 
characteristics which make the interventions selective in nature – states only engage to ones 
that lead to benefits and are likely to result a wanted outcome (Welsh 2004, 62). However, as 
the EU cooperation turned out to be coherent and efective, the success rate of protecting the 
WFP vessels continued as 100% and the overal operation and EU foreign and security 
capacities enjoyed a lot of international appraisal, EU was ready to take more chalenging 
responsibilities to achieve even more power. 
Piracy is one of the big chalenges of our times, both for the region and for the 
international community. [..] I think the operation is going extremely wel. (EU 
NAVFOR 21.5.2010.) 
Rear Admiral Duncan Pots, the Operation Commander, welcomed the visiting 
delegation and led a series of briefings, which focused on the continualy evolving 
EU operation and highlighted 100% success of escorting the World Food 
Programme ships with food aid to Somalia. […] Operation EU 
NAVFOR/ATALANTA continues to be a highly successful mission […] The 
operation continues to be a significant force for good in the region and is making a 
significant impact on the fight against piracy. (EU NAVFOR 22.8.2011.) 
Morgenthau separates three typical situations that favor imperialistic policy – as explained 
already previously. One of these situations is victorious war. According to Morgenthau, 
when a nation engages in a war that foreshadows in its victory, it is most likely seeking a 
permanent change in a power distribution in relation to its counterparts (Morgenthau 2006, 
65). Even though the operations launched by EU, NATO and Combined Maritime Forces are 
in no definition a war, it is a psychological batle in the sense of these actors seeking to 
either increase, stabilize or show of their power. As discussed on previous subchapter, for 
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EU the participation was mainly showing of and keeping its power. However, as the 
original objective was achieved, the extension of the mission’s scope thereinafter epitomize 
new objectives and maybe even new type of foreign policy. Indeed, the victorious war could 
be used to explain EU’s increasing engagement to the region. “The nation wil pursue a 
policy [of imperialism] regardless of what the objectives were at the outbreak of the war” 
(Morgenthau 2006, 65). The EU’s potential for being a global security actor was actualized 
and it perhaps encouraged it to seek even more power. Even though policy of status quo does 
not oppose al changes, taking the pursuing of power too far can eventualy lead to change in 
the power structures – to policy of imperialism. Whether this is likely to happen through 
only one successful operation is perhaps exaggerated, especialy when taken into account 
EU’s less credible background as international security actor compared to other actors in the 
region – EU has too much to catch up that one mission could have a drastic impact. 
There is no geting away from the fact that strategicaly, a naval presence is not 
detering pirates. […] The solution has always and wil always lie ashore. We wil 
continue to ‘hold the line’ at the sea whilst international community, led by the EU, 
adopts a more comprehensive approach ashore. (EU NAVFOR 15.12.2010.) 
In Somalia, the EU has firmly guided the Somaliland region towards a sounder 
democratic process […] EU has played a key role in encouraging a path towards 
constitutional rule. (EU Council8, 6.) 
In 2010, EU’s political leaders and oficials of Operation Atalanta started finaly addressing 
properly the complex problem of piracy and what is needed for its solution and in this way 
demonstrating its wilingness to expand its responsibilities to cover also the more 
fundamentaly chalenging functions. What should be noted is that instead of stressing the 
cooperation as before, EU was increasingly positioning itself as taking the lead with the 
comprehensive approach. As Larik expressed, the Gulf region had become a testing ground 
for multilateral cooperation due to the presence of the many navies from the major global 
players (Larik 2013, 4). As wel could be said, as al the global security players where 
already present, the region was an ideal place to demonstrate prestige as wel as show ones 
capacity of more advanced crisis solution compared to the others. 
For Morgenthau policy of the prestige is often not the “end” itself but rather a contributor to 
either policy of status quo or imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 84). If struggle for power is 
seen as a zero-sum game, EU seems increasingly, by taking the lead, struggling for minds 
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over men to believe that it rather than anyone else possesses the power and motivation to 
lead the international community towards the solution of the problem. Morgenthau uses the 
Cold War as an example of how United States and the Soviet Union were fighting with the 
weapons of prestige to decrease the relative power position of the other and seek imperialism 
(Morgenthau 2006, 91). Similarly, the policy of prestige that EU was implementing seems to 
instead of contributing towards policy of status quo to have an ultimate objective to 
overthrow the mental distribution of power that held other actors active in the region, NATO 
and United States in particular, more capable. 
Given the scale of the EU’s engagement in the region, in terms of development 
assistance, trade and links between our peoples, the EU wil ensure continuity and 
coherence of the diferent strands of its policies, through more efective 
engagement. The volatile situation on the ground merits flexibility and the ability to 
rapidly adapt the EU’s approach and instruments. (EU Council8, 5.) 
The EU is heavily engaged in the region, with involvement focused around five 
main areas: the development partnership, the political dialogue, the response to 
crises, the management of crises and the trade relationship. (EU Council8, 5.) 
Through the EU Strategic Framework that guides EU’s present engagements at the Gulf 
area, also Operation Atalanta, EU has adopted and articulated many other activities related to 
other than maritime security. EU has especialy been concentrating on the enhancing of 
economy, development and trade, humanitarian assistance and crisis responses and 
management. Morgenthau separates three typical means to employ imperialistic policies – 
military imperialism, economic imperialism and cultural imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 
65). These three can work independently though they are most effective when combined 
with each other. As Operation Atalanta has never aimed to physical conquests of certain 
teritories but rather a psychological conquest of power struggle through displaying 
wilingness, capabilities and military force that the weak region gave an opportunity to, 
military imperialism in its literal sense is not applicable to this context. However, the other 
two methods, economic and cultural imperialism, are more corresponding with EU’s 
activities in the Gulf region. As mentioned earlier, Somalia can be seen as a weak state in 
Morgenthau’s definition and as such, imperialistic policy is more likely to take place towards 
it. Weak states rely for their survival on assistance received from more powerful states, and 
this motivates states in general to pursue more economic and cultural power over these 
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states. Military operations as such are a combination of these powers, military in 
instrumental but also cultural in taking over minds to ensure that the political actor has the 
power to undertake and implement these missions. 
To achieve its objectives of peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable 
government, the EU wil […] Support eforts to promote the economic growth of al 
countries and people in the region […]. (EU Council8, 3.) 
 Trade relations between IGAD countries and the EU are governed mainly by the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provisions of Everything But Arms which 
provides duty free access to EU markets for almost al products from Least 
Developed Countries (i.e. al but Kenya). (EU Council8, 6.) 
Both economic and cultural imperialisms are rational methods of gaining power in modern 
times (Morgenthau 2006, 70-72). Country that is practicing economic imperialism has a goal 
to overthrow the status quo by changing power relations through economic control. The 
economic control is usualy indirect but nevertheless efective method of maintaining control 
over a certain area (Morgenthau 2006, 70). EU has been very subtle with spreading its 
economic and trade dominance over North Africa. The process has been articulated as 
bringing aid and investments as wel as increasing the foreign exchange earnings and 
enhancing the economy. However, it has seen to be had negative effects as wel as it has 
made Africa fairly dependent on Europe economicaly. In 2010, 60% of North Africa’s 
export earnings came from Europe (Kamara 2010). 
However, the economic dependency solely instead of moral and ethical reasons can hardly 
be seen as EU’s objective with its eforts to promote economic growth, but rather a side 
efect. Indeed, EU is benefiting financialy from the North Africa’s orientation towards EU 
trade and therefore, in terms of realism, it is through aiding Africa economicaly 
consolidating its influence and securing its interests in the area. However, having a purpose 
of making a weak state dependent on the benefactor cannot be seen as the goal of 
development aid. This is where Morgenthau would perhaps exclude this aspect from the 
sphere of politics as not al actions caried out in international scene is after power thus 
belong to the area of politics (Morgenthau 1960, 27-28). However, I consider it important to 
be acknowledged that through its comprehensive approach including the economic side, EU 
has been able to assert itself as more important and wide-ranging actor in the Gulf region 
with capabilities to address also the underlying problems of piracy and the overal unrest in 
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the region compared to other international security actors. Therefore, the aspect contributes 
not only to the rationale of the topic but to recognizing how EU is trying to achieve power 
and thus recognition for its image as a comprehensive and versatile actor beyond its borders. 
The cultural imperialism uses the control over minds as a tool of changing the power 
relations and its objective is a displacement of one culture over another (Morgenthau 2006, 
72-72). It can use political ideology for example to guide the thoughts and actions of citizen. 
Furthermore, the target of cultural imperialism may be tried to influence through political 
afinities, public sympathy or impressing the “intelectualy influential groups of a foreign 
country with the qualities of a civilization until these groups tend to find the political 
objectives and methods of that civilization equaly atractive” (Morgenthau 1960, 63). 
Certainly, EU’s objectives to for example “implement EU human rights policy in the region” 
through “enhancing coherence, impact and visibility of EU’s multifaceted action in the 
region” could be seen as a way to influence the minds of the intelectualy influential groups 
and atain public sympathy for EU’s increasing influence in the region and its global 
actorness (EU Council8). Consequently, it could have an efect of an upswing of power that 
might change the power structures towards more favorable for EU compared to other 
security actors in the region. 
Building on this engagement and exploiting the opportunities provided for with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the appointment of a High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy and the establishment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the EU aims to become both more visible and more efective 
through a comprehensive approach towards the Horn that wil bring together al EU 
policy strands. (EU Council8, 8.) 
As rationalists see morality as a subordinate in foreign policies and humanitarianism 
representing mainly a strategic tool for political leaders to atain the genuine objectives of 
their foreign policies, the cultural and economic imperialism could be used to explain EU’s 
Strategic Framework (Jude 2012, 42; Gegout 2009, 232; Wheeler 2000, 30). According to 
Hyde-Price it is evident that EU foreign and security policies have been presented as 
“ethical” and as “force for good”. He also recognizes that states do not only trust in the 
balance of power and relative considerations of their power capacities, but more actively 
seek to implement their normative or ideological agendas (Hyde-Price 2008, 30-31). 
Through the Treaty of Lisbon EU was able to increase its influence and functions in the 
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Somali region and improve the estimate of its power relation among other security players 
globaly.  
Indeed, it is important to notice that even though EU stresses cooperation in its Strategic 
Framework with actors like African Union, United Nations and Interpol, other actors 
considered being the lead international actors in regard to security and active in the Gulf area 
like U.S. are not mentioned. Furthermore, NATO is also mentioned only once as to 
cooperate “when appropriate, on counter-piracy and rule of law”. In this way, EU does 
express itself as more powerful to what comes to international activeness in the field of soft 
security in the region. However, rather than seeking to overthrow the complete status quo, it 
seems that EU is more pursuing towards geting prestige and relative power in an area where 
it has more capabilities of doing so as the NATO and U.S. are, in respect, stil appearing 
more powerful when it comes to hard military power. 
Though it seems like EU was, through the evolving mandate of Atalanta as wel as the 
Strategic Framework for Horn of Africa, increasingly seeking for more prestige and 
contributing with that towards imperialism, the policy of status quo does appear also in its 
objectives. EU articulated for the first time the need to protect European citizens in its 
Strategic Framework in 2011. Previously, it had only been stressing the need to protect and 
assist Somali people. “The Strategic Framework also recognizes the need to protect 
European citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region, including 
terorism, piracy and proliferation of arms” (EU Council8, 1). According to John 
Mearsheimer, rational countries are primarily concerned with their own security and survival 
(Mearsheimer 2001). Therefore, even though states would like to act as normative power, 
they are rationaly aware of the power distribution and wil not pursue the ethical or 
normative agendas on the expense of their national safety (Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Indeed, the 
piracy and unstable conditions of Horn of Africa do increasingly affect Europe, through for 
example kidnapping of EU citizens and financing of terorism. Merely protecting the vessels 
in Gulf of Somalia is therefore not enough to safeguard the EU and its citizen but more 
comprehensive actions are needed. Therefore, it could be seen that the expanding the 
mission is also protecting and, in the words of Morgenthau consolidating, EU in the anarchic 
structure of the global world. If EU would not do this, the status quo of the power 
distribution and EU’s existence could be threatened – and policy aiming to consolidate and 
protect is policy of status quo (Morgenthau 2006, 57). 
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3.3. Visibility and recognition 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the launch and extension of the mission have both 
been tools for EU to demonstrate its military power, capacity and wilingness to act as a 
global security actor. They have both been instruments to struggle for power to support its 
emerging international role. Through being active in the Gulf of Aden as wel as in the Horn 
of Africa region it has both been seeking to increase and hold on to its power. The previous 
subchapters were more concentrating on recognizing what kind of foreign policy EU is 
implementing through analyzing its motives and objectives together with the possibilities the 
operation and the overal curent global and regional situation enable. However, to recognize 
the foreign policy type it is also important to detect the main instrumentalities and methods 
the EU is executing in its operation typical for certain foreign policy manifestations. This 
and the folowing subchapter are dedicated to this. 
One of the prevailing methods defining Operation Atalanta and its actions is the extensive 
seeking for visibility and international recognition for both its actions in the region as wel as 
for EU and its priorities. Indeed, visibility has been highlighted explicitly in Strategic 
Framework and implicitly through EU’s means and practices in Operation Atalanta. 
According to Morgenthau, the “desire for social recognition is a dynamic force determining 
social relations and creating social institutions”. Only through reputation a state can get 
security and power, hence in the struggle for both power and existence the opinion of others 
about us is equal of what we truly are (Morgenthau 2006, 84). Thus, this common opinion 
about EU as an international security actor determines its actual position as a security actor 
in global society. In this context the EU’s method of pursuing visibility and recognition 
stands for reason. 
Two instruments of seeking visibility and recognition standing out from the primary material 
are the active PR and awareness-raising of the mission and high profile visits. The Atalanta 
has been taking part, inter alia, to the European Union Open Days where EU introduces its 
activities to the public and has hosted multiple Media Days and Media Events “to increase 
the journalists’ knowledge of the curent situation and their awareness of EU NAVFOR 
operations” and “highlight the EU Naval Force’s (EU NAVFOR) eforts to fight against 
piracy along the East African coast and also support given to humanitarian operations in the 
region” (EU NAVFOR 30.7.2009; EU NAVFOR 8.5.2010; EU NAVFOR 13.6.2011; EU 
NAVFOR 25.10.2011; EU NAVFOR 26.4.2012; EU NAVFOR 14.5.2012). Furthermore, 
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they have met media representatives on board of the flagships as wel as in the ports of 
diferent countries to, for example, “explain the mission and its capacities” (EU NAVFOR 
5.10.2012; EU NAVFOR 3.12.2012; EU NAVFOR 22.1.2014). EU has even established its 
own Facebook site for Atalanta (EU NAVFOR 11.3.2013). 
For Morgenthau, respect or love for institution that forms the basis of domestic politics also 
have an importance for international relations (Morgenthau 2006, 33). “There has been a 
tendency to reduce political power to the actual application of force or at least to equate it 
with successful threats of force and with persuasion, to the neglect of charisma. That neglect, 
as we shal see, accounts in good measure for the neglect of prestige as an independent 
element in international politics” (Morgenthau 2006, 33). For him not taking account the 
charisma of one institution, one can never understand certain phenomena of international 
politics. EU has never particularly been considered charismatic when it comes to its 
actorness in the field of global security politics (Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009). As discussed in 
previous subchapters, EU has on the contrary been seen as incapable to act effectively when 
faced with chalenging situations and international instability. Therefore, the EU’s increasing 
awareness-raising of its mission and successful activities contribute directly towards its 
“façade” and thus build its charisma. The charisma then alows it to build its “estimate of 
power relations as they exist among diferent nations” (Morgenthau 2006, 91). In other 
words, this increase of charisma contributes directly to the impression of the power that EU 
possesses as an international security actor. 
The second instrument EU is using is the high profile visits. The Operation Atalanta 
headquarters and its flagship have been receiving visitors throughout the whole operation to 
learn about the operation and its successes. Furthermore, the Atalanta Force Commanders 
have met with many political leaders during their port visits. Some of the visitors hold a high 
profile in both inside Europe and internationaly. Among these visitors have been King Carl 
XVI Gustaf of Sweden; EU High Representative Catherine Ashton; Ministers of Foreign 
Afairs from Seycheles, Tanzania and Djibouti; Anne Princess Royal, UK Minister for the 
Armed Forces, Minister of Defence of Sweden, President of the Seycheles, French 
Ambassador for international anti-piracy, Chairman of European Union Military Commitee 
and so on (EU NAVFOR 19.3.2009; EU NAVFOR 2.9.2009; EU NAVFOR 9.10.2009; EU 
NAVFOR 19.1.2010; EU NAVFOR 6.5.2010; EU NAVFOR 21.5.2010; EU NAVFOR 
29.10.2010; EU NAVFOR 1.12.2010; EU NAVFOR 31.3.2011; EU NAVFOR 24.6.2011; 
EU NAVFOR 22.8.2011; EU NAVFOR 6.9.2012 ). Furthermore, Atalanta staf has visited 
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or invited many of their counterparts of other missions, especialy NATO and Maritime Task 
Force 150 and 151, operating in the Gulf region to visit them onboard in their vessels as “a 
gesture of cooperation and mutual understanding” (EU NAVFOR 30.3.2009). 
These visits serve as an ilustration of power for EU. Indeed, as mentioned already earlier the 
display of military force is one instrument for policy of prestige – military strength is a 
measure of one’s power and display of it serves as a mean to impress others (Morgenthau 
2006, 90). Morgenthau gives an example of how in peacetime military representatives of 
other nations are invited to see military maneuvers for instance in order to impress them with 
the military capacity, strength and preparedness of the host (Morgenthau 2006, 5). These 
visits have certainly enabled EU to present its strength, successes and capacities to other 
mission leaders as wel as to political leaders inside EU to ensure their support, and outside 
EU to seek recognition, reputation and prestige. 
However, the ilustration power through military display is not the only reason behind the 
high profile visits. Morgenthau portrays diplomatic ceremonial as a way to demonstrate 
power. He gives many examples of ceremonial episodes throughout the history where 
diferent political leaders have demonstrated their superiority over another through rather 
symbolic gestures and forms. Furthermore, he separates the use of diplomats as an 
instrument of policy of prestige. The diplomats are the symbolic representatives of the 
countries and the respect shown by or to them is realy connected to the respect towards the 
countries (Morgenthau 1960, 74). In this light, the invitation of many political leaders of 
diferent countries to visit operation Atalanta seems to be a way of ilustrating the power of 
EU and Atalanta. EU has been inviting the important leaders and politicians as to show that 
Operation Atalanta is truly globaly important security mission. And indeed, the diplomats, 
political leaders such as presidents and ministers, and representatives of other naval missions 
show enough respect towards EU as a credible security actor in the Gulf region to visit 
Atalanta. For Morgenthau, equality of treatment shows equality in reputation of power 
(Morgenthau 1960, 76). Consequently, the reality where mutual visits between other globaly 
recognized security actors can take place equates EU reputation as a security actor with their 
reputation. 
European Union Sings Prosecution Agreement with Kenya. This represents 
important step toward in the EU’s efforts to combat piracy and wil act as a 
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significant deterrent to those considering commiting criminal acts of this kind in 
the region. (EU NAVFOR 6.3.2009.) 
During the meeting Rear Admiral García de Paredes highlighted the success that 
Operation Atalanta and other counter piracy forces are having in the High Risk 
Area, with pirate atacks down from 176 in 2011 to 35 by the end of 2012. (EU 
NAVFOR 8.3.2013.) 
Admiral Jugel ilustrated the success of the mission with the words that 100 percent 
of al vessels of the WFP, which were protected by the Task Force, have reached 
their port destination with their food aid supplies to aleviate the humanitarian 
catastrophe. (EU NAVFOR 25.10.2011.) 
In addition to the previously separated methods of EU to seek visibility and recognition, also 
propaganda as an instrument of a struggle for power can be distinguished from the primary 
material. Morgenthau defines propaganda as a chief instrument that “seeks to increase the 
prestige of one’s own side and deflate that of the enemy, and foreign aid, which intends to 
impress the recipient nation with the economic and technological proficiency of the aid's 
provider” (Morgenthau 2006, 92). As one can see from the previous quotes, EU is often 
highlighting its successes in news releases, interviews, international conferences and during 
the visits of political leaders or its counterparts. This behavior is the core of struggle over the 
minds of men – to convince others of the power that EU possesses as a global international 
security player through stressing its successes achieved in the operation. Furthermore, the 
not so successful parts of the operation that could undermine its power, such as monitoring 
the fishing activities, are not brought to public. This indeed shows EU’s methods of 
implementing policy of prestige and trying to increase its reputation of power and receive 
recognition. 
3.4. Cooperation – the three big ones 
Despite its diversity, the problems of the region are inextricably intertwined – what 
happens in one country can have a profound impact on the others, and the problems 
of one can often only be solved with the involvement of the others. There is 
therefore a logic to dealing with the region as a whole. (EU Council8, 4.) 
The Strategic Framework also recognises the need to protect European citizens 
from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region, including terorism, 
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piracy and the proliferation of the arms. It also identifies a number of common 
chalenges such as climate change and migration. (EU Council8, 4.) 
EU wil […] Ensure that, until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region does not 
threaten the security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through piracy, terorism or 
iregular migration. (EU Council8, 4.) 
“It is necessary to extend the area of operations of Atalanta to include Somali 
internal waters and Somali land teritory. (EU Council10.) 
As Hyde-Price writes; realism considers al actions of a country to be primarily motivated by 
its security and survival due to the anarchic structure of international politics (Hyde-Price 
2008, 30; Mearsheimer 2001). The safety and existence is the priority number one and this 
applies to EU as wel. The piracy at the Horn of Africa started increasingly threatening its 
citizens and EU needed to take measures to protect them and itself. However, the piracy is 
not only a regional problem but global in the sense that it is afecting countries at the other 
side of the globe as wel and needs to be addressed comprehensively. As states have the 
build-in need to pursue power and use this power to shape their environment for more 
secured for themselves, it creates an incentive to cooperate in front of the shared problems 
(Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Cooperate because every political action, mission and deployment 
have embedded chances of failure inside them, and states are not wiling to solely cary the 
risks of failure as this efects their relative power capabilities but share the benefits of 
success. Therefore, EU was wiling to expand the mission to address also the root causes of 
piracy and shape its international “milieu” for more secured in cooperation with other actors. 
This expansion could mean an increase in the amount of resources for the operation 
and also increase in cooperation and colaboration with NATO and others carying 
out operations in this area. (EU NAVFOR 26.2.2010.) 
EU NAVFOR and CTF 151 have already forged close links at the sea and are part 
of the wider “coalition of wiling” to counter seaborne criminality. (EU NAVFOR 
16.7.2009.) 
The Commanders of three Task Forces operating in the Horn of Africa and of the 
coast of Somalia reafirmed their views that they were working closely together to 
fight Piracy and alow international merchant shipping safe passage to transport 
48 
 
their cargos al over the world without hindrance or danger from seaborne 
criminals. (EU NAVFOR 24.7.2009.) 
There is an excelent cooperation with other maritime forces, mainly of NATO and 
the Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF). (EU NAVFOR 10.12.2011.) 
Moreover, the continued coordination between EU NAVFOR, NATO and the 
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) alows greater impact. (EU NAVFOR 
22.2.2012.) 
According to Kenneth Waltz, the cooperation in front of shared problem to shape the 
international milieu is more likely to happen between the “great powers” due to the fact that 
they possess the capabilities to acquire responsibility and they have more at stake in the 
stability of the system (Hyde-Price 2008, 31; Waltz 1979, 194-210). More at stake because 
the instability weakens their relative power position not merely concrete but due to the fact 
that if they are not prepared to take actions, the perception of their power would appear 
smaler than it actualy is. This is a rather good example of negative policy of prestige, and it 
afects the image of the state and how other states regard it and might lead to actual loss of 
power (Morgenthau 2006, 94-98). 
Indeed, it was important to cooperate with other actors to combat piracy comprehensively. 
However, as from the quotes one can see, even though there were many states active in Gulf 
of Somalia, EU has highlighted its cooperation mainly with the two globaly recognized and 
important security players: NATO and U.S. through the Combined Task Force 150 and 151. 
This proves the point that EU has truly self-proclaimed itself as a “great power”, global 
security player and seeks prestige for this “estimate of its power relation” in relation to the 
other actors (Morgenthau 2006, 91-92). In practice, the operation is a manifestation of two 
purposes in this context: increasing EU’s reputation as global security actor as wel as 
ensuring its safety and existence. As policy of prestige, even though implemented here, is 
not the end as discussed before but contributes either to policy of imperialism or status quo, 
the end could be seen, due to the EU objective of securing itself to be, instead of shifting the 
power distribution completely, the status quo. 
The Head of Department and Representative of Sweden to the PSC, Olof Skoog 
stated, the EU was able to position the EU NAVFOR Mission in the Centre of al 
anti-Piracy activities. (EU NAVFOR 12.10.2009.) 
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At operational level EU Coordination Cel shal act as the point of contact with, in 
particular, ship owners’ organisations, the relevant department of UN Secretariat, 
the World Food Program and the International Maritime Organisation, and with 
Combined Task Force 150 within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
(EU Council1.) 
It is also necessary for practical reasons to provide for the possibility of exchanging 
classified information in the theatre of operations. (EU Council7.) 
Scot Sanders USN, Commander of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) on 
board of the CTF 151 flagship USS ANZIO (CG68). The meeting was held to 
deepen the cooperation between two task forces to deter, disrupt and suppress 
piracy on the waters surrounding Somalia. (EU NAVFOR 28.8.2009.) 
The prestige does manipulate and make minor adjustments to the relative distribution of 
power thus increasing it for EU. However, as aforementioned, EU does not aim to overthrow 
the setled and internationaly recognized global security actors completely but position itself 
next to them as alternative and powerful security source as equaly capable to take actions. 
As mentioned earlier in subchapter 3.2. EU seeks prestige specificaly when it has good 
chances of succeeding. In functions where it is particularly efective and operational, such as 
humanitarian and development aspects, it appears to take the lead. However, it stresses 
cooperation in the overal context highlighting specific actions such as operational support 
and sharing strategic information. These actions are specific but important for the success of 
the overal combat of piracy. This alows EU to share the credit of the security situation 
improvement in Horn of Africa, which consequently makes EU more credible as a security 
actor. In other words, the cooperation with the main international security actors benefits EU 
as it shares the credit and thus equalizes the distribution of power which otherwise could 
accumulate to the ones that already possess it. 
Morgenthau defined aliances as “a necessary functions of balance of power” that can add 
one’s own power the power of other nations. These aliances for him require a community of 
interests as necessity for their establishment and have often targeted enemy (Morgenthau 
1960, 181). EU is not seeking to establish an aliance with CMF and NATO as such even 
though in Gulf of Somalia context they do have a common enemy, pirates. However, the 
aliance concept can be used to explain certain EU foreign policy objectives. As said earlier, 
EU seeks, through highlighting cooperation between it and other big global security actors, 
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to position itself next to them and gain some of their power. Indeed, as in aliance, the 
distribution of benefits is enabled through close cooperation (Morgenthau 1960, 181). When 
other missions have succeeded to decrease piracy rates, it benefits EU directly through 
increase of its security, but also indirectly through highlighting the general success of the 
common anti-piracy efforts. As an example, EU together with NATO and CMF have 
received the Lloyd’s List Newsmaker of the Year –award for their “outstanding eforts to 
combat the threat of piracy of the coast of Somalia” (EU NAVFOR 21.11.2011). The 
visibility and recognition that the other two missions are receiving contribute to the 
visibility, recognition and prestige of EU as wel because it has been able to proclaim itself 
as the counter-piracy big third. The distribution of benefits plausibly corelates with the 
distribution of power within aliance. As the benefits seem to increasingly be shared, EU is 
certainly enjoying a strengthening image of its power with the help of the other two security 
actors. 
Counter Piracy “Big Three” Meet at Sea. On 18 July the Force Commanders of the 
three international Counter-Piracy task forces, EU NAVFOR, NATO Ocean Shield 
and Combined Task Force 151 met on board of NATO flagship to exchange 
experience and coordinate the fight against piracy. (EU NAVFOR 23.7.2012.) 
Counter-Piracy “Big Three” Meet at Sea […] met on board of the EU NAVFOR 
flagship […] .(EU NAVFOR 24.8.2012.) 
But how is EU then been able to self-proclaim itself as the big security actor next to NATO 
and U.S. and why do I cal this mainly as policy of prestige from EU’s behalf? As explained 
in previous subchapter, according to Morgenthau “Equality in treatment would have meant 
equality of prestige – that is, reputation of power” (Morgenthau 2006, 86). EU has been 
since the beginning of the mission inviting NATO and U.S. led missions CTF 150 and 151 
oficials for meetings. Morgenthau gives Cold War as an example of war fought with 
weapons of prestige. During this time U.S. and Soviet Union did not only try to impress the 
hostile aliance to weaken their morale but their own alies with their military might 
(Morgenthau 1960, 81). Through the military visits EU has been able to demonstrate its 
capacity. Furthermore, with increasing visibility, acquirement of tasks and its self-promotion 
as one of the big three have indeed made EU be treated equaly between the major security 
actors, and hence enabled EU to receive equality of prestige. 
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Commodore Bindt explained the curent coordination of the counter piracy eforts 
between EU NAVFOR, CMF and NATO to increase the efectiveness and 
eficiency of their combined counter piracy forces. (EU NAVFOR 23.11.2009.) 
However, the self-promotion and demonstrating its capabilities to the major security players 
is not enough to be lifted universaly to the major league. It has also been necessary for EU 
to assert its superiority compared to the rest of the actors in the Gulf of Somalia. As stated 
earlier, for Morgenthau equality of treatment symbolizes equality of prestige. “Humiliation 
of the representatives of foreign countries was intended to symbolize inferiority in power of 
the countries they represented” (Morgenthau 2006, 86). The earlier quote, where 
Commodore Bindt stressed the cooperation between the counter-piracy big three is given 
during China’s visit on operation Atalanta flagship. Similar statements have been said during 
the visits of other mission representatives that do not represent NATO or CMF, as wel. The 
statements are not “humiliation” to the leter, but they do demonstrate EU’s superior position 
to these other actors whom the statements are presented to by stressing the EU’s position in 
the “aliance” of the major players which they are not part of. 
4. Fundamental realities and emerging opportunities  
In the previous chapter the empirical material was analyzed descriptively through directed 
content analysis that received predetermined codes from Morgenthau’s three manifestations 
of foreign policy. It was discovered that most often EU’s methods of functioning and actions 
in the context of Operation Atalanta, its launch and extension as wel as its ambitions 
invoked by the curent political and security environment in the Somali region and EU’s 
power relations in regard to international security seem by its features to be representing 
policy of prestige. However, not everything in regard to the Operation Atalanta and its 
means of action and underlying objectives fited into the category of prestige. Indeed, the 
variables and key concepts of the other two manifestations of foreign policies, imperialism 
and status quo, were able to be identified as wel. 
The policy of status quo is represented in regard to the launch of the operation serving as a 
safeguard against disadvantages such as losing international credibility by not taking actions. 
Furthermore, it can be distinguished in the context of EU protecting its citizens as wel as 
consolidating and securing itself through expanding the mission and adopting the strategic 
framework. Consequently, engaging in cooperation to shape the international milieu for 
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more secure can be seen as contributing towards holding on to the existing power. However, 
these aforementioned points were mainly implemented by means of policy of prestige, even 
though contributing to policy of status quo. Despite that, additional subcategory to the 
coding scheme method is not needed. Certainly, Morgenthau had already noticed this 
tendency when defining the objectives of policy of prestige – policy of prestige is frequently 
used in support of policy of status quo (Morgenthau 2006, 91). Consequently, the EU can be 
said every now and then to be implementing policy of prestige for the purpose of policy of 
status quo as to hold on to its present power and consolidate itself. 
Furthermore, many findings from the empirical material seem also, from the outset, to fit 
into the category of policy of imperialism as Morgenthau defines it. Certainly, the situations 
where it typicaly arises – existing of weak state and victorious “war” as wel as the typical 
means employed by imperialistic foreign policy, the economic and cultural imperialism, can 
be distinguished from the material. However, in the view of the objectives of policy of 
imperialism – acquiring world empire, continental empire or local preponderance – it cannot 
be said that EU was implementing it even though it was pursuing an increase of power as it 
is not trying to move towards these three goals of imperialism.  
EU can indeed already be considered a continental empire inside its borders and immediately 
across them. With operation Atalanta it was pursuing to be recognized globaly. Therefore, it 
does not have geographical boundaries as such. However, world empire, according to 
Morgenthau, does not know any rational limits to its expansion. Nation seeking it can only 
be stopped by a superior force (Morgenthau 2006, 67). EU and its actorness have rational 
limits in the context of Operation Atalanta: EU is aware of its capabilities and it acts inside 
that framework. Furthermore, as the power was not aimed to overthrow the whole present 
equilibrium but to adjust it by locating EU next to the other big security actors, it is not 
seeking hegemony i.e. world empire. Local preponderance could be seen as appropriate as it 
is not bound by geographical limits but sets its own constraints based on objective facts 
beyond it is unwise to go. However, as EU is stil not trying to overthrow the power of 
NATO or CMF completely through Atalanta, it is not fuly compatible either. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, with operation Atalanta EU has been implementing 
actions and engaging in the Gulf region through means that are considered to be 
imperialistic. However, through this it is merely seeking to increase power to the maximum 
where it can and in a way seeking to be considered equal in terms of power to act in global 
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security maters. Also, the cooperation between the main security actors in the region proves 
this point – through to cooperative means EU is asserting itself as major security player next 
to the NATO and U.S. led CMF, and sharing their success to enable more equal distribution 
of power. 
It is apparent that EU is trying to increase its power to support its emerging role as a security 
actor through the means of both policy of prestige and policy of imperialism. Stil, the 
objective of policy of imperialism, to overthrow the present balance of power, does not exist 
in the EU’s foreign policy as such. Indeed, EU is trying to adjust the power distribution and 
shift the power structures towards more beneficial to its position, but not overthrow the 
whole equilibrium. However, it is not trying to stay in the status quo state either. Therefore, a 
supplementary subcategory to the coding scheme is required at this point. This subcategory 
does not prove the theory wrong or ofer a contradictory view of the phenomenon as Hsieh 
and Shannon anticipated (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283). It mainly extends and expands 
the theory taking features from al of the three policy manifestations. This subcategory is 
defined as foreign policy seeking to increase international power to be considered as a 
credible security actor next to the other major actors. However, as this stil is adjusting the 
power positions, it needs to be kept in mind that it might eventualy, if taken too far, lead to 
the overthrow of the present equilibrium – to the policy of imperialism. 
The folowing subchapters wil be dedicated to the more general pondering of the results of 
the analysis and EU’s actions in regard to the Operation Atalanta in the overal EU context. 
Its present foreign policy environment and its future and chalenges it faces when 
implementing the exact foreign policy type as wel as underlying efects for mission 
engagement outside its teritory and global actorness wil be reviewed. As power is seen as 
context-dependent by realists and subject to dynamic change it is very important to tie the 
results back to concrete EU policy environment to find meanings from the policy it 
implements in the present context in order to make generalizations and form paterns. This 
was done slightly already at the previous chapter in order to make the interpretation of the 
empirical material apprehensive. However, it is important to expand and amplify this 
rendering to find out the embedded interests in EU’s engagement and to tie the main 
interests determining its actions in regard to Operation Atalanta to the curent policy 
environment and the structural framework within which it operates in order to recognize 
social situations where it might answer with repetitive paters. As mentioned in the 
introduction, comprehending where the EU’s priorities lie in the sphere of foreign politics 
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together with the curent environment that enables the implementation of these priorities wil 
help us understand the paterns of EU responding to crisis situations, and whether it could 
constitute as the alternative security source wiling to engage in functions beyond its borders 
and increasingly chalenge other big security actors in the future. 
4.1. The change in the foreign policy framework 
The EU cooperation has been deepening and widening for a long period of time already, and 
as the Union has grown bigger and been adopting more functions and responsibilities to 
cover, also the expectations of it in regard to global chalenges have grown internaly and 
externaly. EU has demonstrated its global ambitions and aspirations in multiple contexts 
(Van Lagenhove 2010, 5). However, the former foreign policy framework that is meant to 
provide EU with the instruments and supplies to play a global role was sufering from 
significant shortcomings. According to Jonas Paul these shortcomings can be summarized as 
“a lack of leadership, continuity, consistency and diplomatic resources”, which result in “a 
lack of strategic thinking, proactive decision-making and coherent action” (Paul 2008, 8). 
Therefore, EU was sufering a negative policy of prestige – estimation of power that is 
inferior to the actual power possessed (Morgenthau 2006, 98). Consequently, to fulfil its 
objective and acquire a more powerful role in world politics as wel as in the field of global 
security, EU needed some new guidelines. Joachim Fritz-Vannahme articulated it as the need 
for “sustainable basic concepts and a new story line” that enables the European external self-
assertion (Fritz-Vannahme 2009, 1-2). 
Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon and the changes it made to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy can be seen as the new guidelines enabling EU to respond to the global chalenges. 
According to Jean-Luc Dehaene, the former Vice-President of the European Convention, the 
Treaty of Lisbon serves as “a new European quantum leap” alowing EU to play global role 
(Van Lagenhove 2010, 5). Fritz-Vannahme cals the need for EU to establish a positive 
estimate of its international power position as self-assertion, however, prestige works as a 
synonym. EU needed to receive prestige both to and through its amended foreign policy 
doctrine. As interpreted in previous chapter, the launch of the Operation Atalanta served as a 
window of opportunity to EU’s struggle for power – for both holding on to its power in the 
light of disadvantages if not able to engage the mission, but also for prestige to demonstrate 
its power and receive easy recognition as a legitimate, wiling and robust international 
security actor. Already during the times of the launch it was known that EU wil adopt the 
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Treaty of Lisbon that wil also change the foundation of the Operation Atalanta – the treaty 
was concluded already in 2007 but entered eventualy in force in January 2009. Why, despite 
this and the acknowledged need to assure the international community of the capabilities of 
the new foreign policy, did EU at the beginning lean more towards implementing policy of 
prestige to contribute towards policy of status quo and not the newly established subcategory 
of seeking to increase international power to be considered as a credible security actor next 
to the other major actors through means of both, policy of prestige and imperialism? 
The reason for this might be that EU was somehow testing its capabilities. It was not yet 
self-confident enough nor did it possess the needed resources of power to seek to increase 
power in more imperialistic means such as asserting itself as the lead and spreading 
economic dominance and cultural influence over the minds of men. Indeed, as explained in 
the subchapter 3.1. the functions that it took over were stil fairly easy at this point. 
However, while it made remarkable progress, succeeded with its tasks, and received 
recognition from other global security players and high profile politicians through visits and 
increasing cooperation for example, it also acquired more self-confidence, prestige and 
power and was ready to engage with more chalenging functions and take over even more 
responsibilities.  
As the power and self-confidence grew, EU was indeed more eager to take over 
responsibilities and implement policy to increase power through prestige and imperialistic 
tools. According to Fritz-Vannahme, the criticism within the EU of geting very litle done 
despite the great deal of rhetoric is justified (Fritz-Vannahme 2009, 6). Operation Atalanta 
was a perfect chance not only to seek prestige and power to demonstrate the wilingness of 
the EU, but also to acquire visibility and recognition for the new foreign policy and 
demonstrate its capabilities. Indeed, EU needed more prestige now when it had established 
more coherent and functional EU foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon created in practice a 
more functional base for EU’s international security actorness, but without increasing its 
reputation of performance and convincing the global society of its power, it could not be 
seen as credible actor. Therefore, stressing its position as one of the big three, acquiring lead 
with some functions and especialy establishing the comprehensive approach after the Treaty 
of Lisbon are reinforcing this view. 
However, it needs to be reckoned that EU also needed to increase its functions after the 
Treaty of Lisbon expanded its functionality in regard to foreign politics. The treaty 
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established the position of a high representative to, for example, create consensus among 
member states, act as the one voice of foreign afairs, execute the CFSP, as wel as 
coordinate crisis management missions to ensure eficiency and consistency of the EU’s 
international eforts. Furthermore, the treaty established the External Action Service, legal 
bases for the European Defence Agency and a start-up fund for CSDP operations to alow 
prompt access to financing of urgent initiatives. It expanded EU’s crisis management tasks 
and simplified European Council decision making (Europa 2014.) Furthermore, the Treaty of 
Lisbon enabled the execution of CSDP tasks by a group of member states acting together 
with the high representative and “a group of countries to enter into a permanent structured 
cooperation” (Paul 2008, 13-15). According to Paul, this single legal personality wil remove 
al doubts “about the Union’s capacity to act under international law and within international 
organisations” (Paul 2008, 13). Indeed, if EU would not, in the light of al the new 
possibilities that the Treaty of Lisbon enabled, be able to expand the Operation Atalanta and 
show increasing coherence, power and prestige, the Treaty of Lisbon together with EU’s 
engagement towards more global actorness would look like a complete failure and lead to a 
loss of power in the relative power relations. 
In addition of enabling more functional foreign policy, the Treaty of Lisbon enabled more 
pooled sovereignty and concentration of power internaly, which are crucial aspects when 
seeking for international position. As Fritz-Vannahme articulated, EU that wishes to assert 
itself can “no longer aford never-ending disputes or a visible lack of solidarity, nor lengthy 
periods of inactivity designed to facilitate the alignment of common positions” (Fritz-
Vannahme 2009, 3). Indeed, the treaty enhanced professionalism and potential to mitigate 
the lack of leadership in EU. The Treaty of Lisbon created some solidarity among member 
countries and alowed more independent and rapid decision-making which enables EU to 
work more coherently towards the international security actorness. The centralized decision-
making is seen as strengthening EU. (Paul 2008.) 
In short, EU already had the motivation to pursue a role of a credible international actor 
when launching the Operation Atalanta. It wanted to hold on to its present power but as it 
knew already about the forthcoming adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, it also wanted to seek 
prestige for it. Furthermore, EU knew at the point of the launch which possibilities the 
structure of the new foreign policy doctrine enables, but it did not yet have the self-
confidence nor the power to implement other policy than policy of status quo and prestige 
contributing towards status quo. However, when the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted it enabled 
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EU to pursue global role through providing for more consistent, eficient and visible external 
action. This, together with the growing power, self-confidence due to the previous successes 
and the need to prove the capabilities of the new policy, EU’s motivation to increase its 
power via policy of prestige as wel as more imperialistic means and amend the international 
power structures grew as wel.  
In the future, we can expect EU to seek to increase its power through policy of prestige and 
even by imperialistic means within the existing EU structures and chalenge other 
international security actors. However, it is important to remember that even though the 
foreign policy setings as wel as the coherence and interests of the member countries were 
in place for Operation Atalanta, the social reality is prone to change (Morgenthau 2006, 7). 
Even though the Treaty of Lisbon developed tools for more functional, comprehensive, 
robust and coherent external action, EU is stil as strong as its member countries together. As 
in the field of EU foreign policy the national governments retain significant autonomy of 
decision-making due to the unanimity rule, much wil depend on their political wil (Paul 
2008, 6). And this political wil is very much subject to the national interests, chalenges 
yielding from the area of action, economic capabilities and the conceptions of the benefits 
gained compared to possible losses, or in the words of Morgenthau, principle of economy of 
efort (Morgenthau 2006, 7). However, it is important to note that the present foreign policy 
framework indeed gives more solid ground and instruments when needed to pursue power 
globaly.  
4.2. International positioning and EU actorness 
In the previous subchapter the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon and the change in the EU’s 
foreign policy doctrine to the overal EU foreign policy manifestation, objectives and 
practical possibilities were analyzed. We could notice that the change enabled EU to 
implement more power pursuing foreign policy and indeed reinforced its atempts as wel as 
the motivation to amend the power distribution. EU has for longer time already had the 
aspirations to become a global actor, the amended CFSP just gave more functional tools and 
the needed push for it. However, as aforementioned, the general foreign policy framework 
cannot solely define EU’s future position in the global security field. Previously the impact 
of the growing estimation of power together with the increasing self-confidence was 
elaborated. This subchapter is more dedicated to bundle up the underlying motivations of the 
EU in regard to the power position it is pursuing internationaly with the chalenges and 
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opportunities the global environment and social reality creates for its atempts. Furthermore, 
I wil criticaly analyze the impact that the Operation Atalanta together with the policy type 
it demonstrates can have on the global power relations. 
EU was since the beginning of Operation Atalanta trying to achieve more centralized 
position in the global world in regard to security. At first, it demonstrated wilingness by 
launching the operation to work also outside its borders. However, launch could be as wel 
seen as a way for EU to protect itself against disadvantages and hold on to its power as 
mentioned earlier. Furthermore, it seemed to be playing it safer by engaging in actions that 
were more manageable but despite this able to bring easy prestige for Atalanta. Already at 
this point EU was highlighting the cooperation between itself and other actors in the field. 
Therefore, it is noticeable that the EU was not trying to yet shift the power structures 
remarkably but mainly gain prestige, as reputation of power, and keep the power it had. 
However, the underlying fundamental objective to gain more power to be considered as a 
major security actor was stil present, but EU did not yet have the power nor the self-
confidence to actualize this more aggressively. 
However, as the Atalanta expanded, so did the EU’s aspirations in regard to its power 
position. According to Luk Van Lagenhove, becoming a global actor is not only determined 
by internal maters but it also depends on a number of external forces (Van Lagenhove 
2010). Similarly in Morgenthau’s vocabulary, EU needed to get a positive estimate of its 
power internationaly to be centered in the core of the global actions and therefore, it needed 
to show of its power increasingly. EU used Atalanta as a disguise to pursue prestige by 
deploying and displaying its military force. Furthermore, it was increasing its activities to 
cover more fundamentaly complex problems to show its capacities. Indeed, the functions it 
took over can be considered imperialistic according to Morgenthau. EU was, through the 
comprehensive approach spreading its economic influence as wel as implementing EU’s 
human rights policy and thus struggling over the minds of people through cultural 
imperialism. It was also seeking increased visibility and recognition through the high profile 
visits and awareness-raising of the mission. Especialy it was stressing its own functionality, 
successes and cooperation with the major actors and thus building up its charisma. 
In addition, EU was increasingly taking the lead in maters that are considered more as soft 
power. However, even though taking the lead, it could not be seen as overthrowing the 
power of NATO or United States. Nicole Koenig writes in the context of EU’s response to 
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crisis in Libya that the “Libyan crisis showed that while it is stil business as usual if the EU 
fails to deliver in the field of ‘hard power’, it is expected to step in when it comes to ‘soft 
power’. The famous metaphor on the transatlantic division of labour comes to mind in which 
NATO (that is, the US) ‘prepares dinner’ while the EU ‘washes the dishes’” (Koenig 2011, 
29). Similarly, for EU to balance the power of the other two major actors in the region, it 
needed to pursue power in an imperialistic way where it could because in more hard power 
context it is stil seen as the underdog. 
The highlighting the cooperation with the major security actors in the Gulf region proves the 
point that EU was not seeking to overthrow the curent power distribution but to adjust it to 
place itself among the powerful core. Through placing itself in the same line as NATO and 
CMF and emphasizing their cooperation as the big three EU was able to accumulate their 
success and receive recognition and power from the overal success of the western anti-
piracy eforts and thus equalize the relative power relations between the actors. Indeed, it can 
be seen that EU was using Operation Atalanta as a benchmark or flagship to demonstrate its 
equal capabilities to be a global security actor next to the other major ones and through it 
push it self towards the core. 
But as articulated above, the motivation and internal capabilities are not the only ones 
afecting on one’s atempts to become a major power. The outside forces such as present 
security architecture and the political environment create chalenges. The Treaty of Lisbon 
gave EU the recourses and internal coherence to assert itself globaly and the Operation 
Atalanta gave a window of opportunity to demonstrate these resources in practical terms. But 
indeed, there are other powers undermining EU’s efforts. Van Lagenhove notes that for 
example demographic decline and shifting of economic power away from Europe are 
weakening EU’s global position. For him EU needs to deepen its integration with the rest of 
the Western world as wel as step up its role in multilateral system to strengthen global 
governance (Van Lagenhove 2010). This multipolarity that Lagenhove describes can be seen 
as not just redistributing the power but changing the players of the game, as wel (Van 
Lagenhove 2010, 18). Through cooperation with the major powers and demonstrating 
superiority among the rest of the actors in Gulf of Aden EU was distinguishing itself and 
trying to locate itself as one of the poles. This way it was not seeking for imperialism and 
hegemony but instead to increase its power to be accepted among the main global security 
powers, have its voice heard when it comes to decision-making in the context of global 
security and be able to project its interests more freely. Despite the contrary opinion of Van 
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Lagenhove, as the power relations are relative, and therefore some players wil possess more 
of it than others, multilateral world can indeed have its “star players” (Van Lagenhove 2010, 
24).  
However, there is stil a need for pondering whether the Operation Atalanta is in fact enough 
to demonstrate EU’s power to make it a global actor. The piracy at Gulf of Somalia through 
creating a security situation caling for interference from powerful actors staged an arena for 
power struggle that became a perfect opportunity for EU to manifest itself. According to 
Morgenthau, when equilibrium is disturbed by outside forces, in this case by piracy, system 
shows a tendency to establish new equilibrium (Morgenthau 2006, 186). However, crisis at 
Gulf of Somalia and the powers of the mission cannot be said to have such leverage that it 
could have indeed overthrown the complete global balance of power. Rather, it was 
subverting it enabling a crack where EU could manifest its power and increase it gradualy. 
EU was in regard to piracy able to demonstrate itself as competent actor globaly and that 
gave the recognition needed to shift the power structures to show it as wiling and capable of 
robust action. However, Operation Atalanta is one mission among others. As the power 
structures are subject to change, EU needs to increasingly continue demonstrating its power. 
If failing to take a stand when a new crisis situation emerges, it is prone to lose its powers it 
gained with Atalanta. 
4.3. Engaging in military operations 
In previous subchapters the foreign policy framework providing EU the capabilities and 
supplies to play a global role was analyzed. Furthermore, the change of the framework and 
how it has afected on EU priorities and global aspirations and thus the foreign policy type it 
is implementing was reviewed. In addition, the underlying motivations of the EU in regard 
to the power position it is pursuing internationaly through Operation Atalanta together with 
the chalenges and opportunities the global environment and social reality creates was 
pondered upon. However, to find meanings and recognize the situations deriving from the 
contemporary security environment in which the EU might in the future answer in similar 
way as to Operation Atalanta we need to pore over the embedded interests determining 
which CFSP missions EU engages. 
In regard to the Operation Atalanta, the main interests to engage in the mission, next to the 
economic reasons elaborated in introduction, can be seen to have been EU’s fear of 
disadvantages and wil to receive visibility, power and prove itself as a credible global 
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security actor and thus amend the relative power structures more beneficial to itself. As the 
Treaty of Lisbon was formaly adopted EU needed to increasingly afirm its functionality 
internationaly and demonstrate that it now has the wilingness, the proper tools and the 
coherence needed to realy act as a global player to common good. However, EU was aware 
of its powers and started slow in the beginning in regard to its functions and responsibilities 
in the Operation Atalanta increasing them gradualy as the prestige and power grew. 
According to Hyde-Price, states as rational actors recognize the structural power 
distributions and do not seek to pursue normative or international agendas on the expense of 
its own welbeing (Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Consequently, even though in regard to the 
Operation Atalanta EU was implementing policy of prestige even with imperialistic means at 
the end, in the crisis situation where cons defeat the pros, EU wil most likely engage itself 
with policy of status quo and protect and consolidate only its own existence. 
Indeed, the private interests are always heavily involved and lead the shaping of the 
international environment. The goals of foreign policies are always to project and defend 
state’s interests internationaly (Jackson and Sorenson 2010, 59). Hyde-Price considers it 
ironic that the Europeans see through the ethical disguise of U.S. foreign policy but are not 
able to recognize the strategic behavior of the EU actions in the field of foreign politics 
(Hyde-Price 2008, 32). According to Germond and Smith, the maritime frontiers of the EU 
are hybrid and even though legaly situated outside the EU they are functionaly inside its 
strategic zone of interests. They separate six distinct reasons for EU to get engaged in the 
Gulf of Somalia; pirates constituting a threat to EU citizen and European energy security, 
harming marine environment and trade, pirates might create links to terorists and finaly 
they harm the Somali population by hampering the food aid deliveries (Germond and Smith 
2009, 597-581). Indeed, only one of them is not closely linked to EU and its welbeing even 
though the Operation Atalanta was at the beginning launched especialy with the 
humanitarian justification to protect particularly the WFP vessels delivering food aid. 
Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the main reason for EU engaging to military missions 
outside its borders is its own prosperity and welbeing. Operation Atalanta was an example 
of protecting EU citizen and consolidating EU under the public eye by receiving prestige 
through launching the operation. By receiving power and prestige EU gets accepted among 
the big security players and can have more effect on the global decision-making in regard to 
the future crisis situations and also have power to engage in mission that benefit it in the 
future. Furthermore, the power that it was increasingly able to gain through the Operation 
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Atalanta created a positive conception of prestige that can deter other, power relations wise 
inferior, actors from chalenging EU and its power. The anarchic structure of the global 
system together with the relative power positions create power competition between bigger 
actors inherently and that leads to so-caled self-help system where states need to rely on 
their own capabilities to protect themselves and their interests (Hyde-Price 2008, 36). As 
Koenig stated in the context of Libyan crisis in 2011, the U.S. was demonstrating growing 
reluctance to “prepare dinner in Europe’s backyard”. Indeed, EU needed to become a 
credible actor with strategic consensus and coherent responses to crisis situations in order to 
defend its interests and to protect itself implicitly (Koenig 2011, 29). 
However, as EU is a union combined of nation states their private interests and motivations 
do have a crucial impact on EU’s engagement on military missions outside its borders due to 
the unanimity rule. To be as coherent to launch operations as in the Operation Atalanta, the 
benefits and interests need to actualize for EU member states. Without them seeing the 
benefits and the power it brings upon, in addition to been convinced by the litle 
disadvantages and EU’s actual capabilities of succeeding with the functions it takes over, 
EU’s foreign engagement could get paralyzed. In regard to Operation Atalanta, the need to 
protect EU citizens and the possibilities that the engagement would bring in regard to 
receiving prestige to both EU and its new foreign policy framework as wel as the economic 
benefits, legitimization from UN and the apparent humanitarian aspect of the mission 
creating good publicity was generaly convincing enough to EU member states to accept the 
launch. 
Indeed, one needs also to keep in mind that EU even though considered as a global actor 
needs a justification and space for taking actions through military means outside its borders. 
“A global power is not only a mater of one’s relatively strength. It is also determined by the 
playing fields or ‘theatres’ where such power and influence can manifest themselves” (Van 
Lagenhove 2010, 9). Certainly, having power is not giving legitimization to further 
implement policy of imperialism nor prestige. It might not even be enough to implement 
policy of status quo, that is, to defend one’s power position and implicitly threatened safety 
through military means. Morgenthau cals this the use of legitimate and usable power that 
EU had due to the legitimization of the mission by United Nations as wel as through the 
apparent humanitarian justification. EU can show its global security actorness and engage in 
missions only in marked theatres, because demonstrating or increasing power without 
justification might lead to loss of credibility, charisma, international resistance by other 
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major players and eventualy actual loss of power. Therefore, EU can be seen to realy 
engage on military actions beyond its borders when it is caled upon the global society, there 
is a personal interests to do so and the benefits are bigger than the possible disadvantages. 
5. Conclusion 
The thesis concentrated on analyzing European Union’s actions and their underlying 
motivations in the context of EU NAVFOR Atalanta to unravel what kind of foreign policy 
EU is implementing and what power position it is seeking through it. The realistic theory of 
the three foreign policy manifestations from Hans Morgenthau created the theoretical 
framework for the study. According to him, al politics in the field of foreign afairs are 
struggle for power; either to increase, stabilize or demonstrate it. Hence, he has divided the 
foreign policies into three types: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo and policy of 
prestige. The objective was to find out which one of these three manifestations EU executes 
and carries out within the frame of Atalanta and whether it is trying to acquire a greater role, 
status and impact world-wide as a security actor or merely showing of or consolidating its 
power. Furthermore, as the operation was launched when Treaty of Lisbon had already been 
sealed but before it entered into force, the operation has been operational throughout the 
process of strengthening the EU foreign policy framework. Therefore, it was meaningful to 
also concentrate whether the foreign policy type EU was implementing changed after the 
Lisbon Treaty and how this was visible through its actions. 
After introducing the theoretical framework and the three main policy types more in detail 
the thesis embarked upon analyzing the primary material consisting out of the relevant 
Council Decisions, Council Conclusions and Council Joint Actions regarding operation 
Atalanta, the Council Conclusion of Horn of Africa and EU Strategic Framework that guides 
EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa region as wel as relevant oficial press releases of 
Atalanta. Directed content analysis was used as the methodology to create a deeper inter-
linkage between the theory and the primary material from the beginning. The three foreign 
policy types from Morgenthau operated as the main categories providing the coding scheme 
for the analysis of the empirical material and defining its main concepts, variables and the 
mutual relations between the categories. The material was coded through the lenses of the 
theory and categorized into these three foreign policy manifestations. The theory was also 
used to guide the dialogue between the empirical material, itself and rationale further. 
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The empirical testing demonstrated that the launch of the Operation Atalanta served as a 
window of opportunity for EU to demonstrate its military capacity and wilingness to act in 
the global security arena and receive power in a legitimate manner. Through the Operation 
Atalanta EU was able to receive fairly easy and robust visibility, recognition and prestige. 
However, it used the policy of prestige it was for the most part carying out to contribute 
towards status quo – consolidating its existence. Indeed, EU would have faced multiple 
disadvantages if it would not have been able to launch the mission. The piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden was indirectly affecting the safety of EU citizens and as the situation in the Somali 
coast was enjoying a lot of publicity, not taking part of the international actions in the region 
would have meant losing its credibility as a security actor wiling to work beyond its borders 
for EU. 
However, as the operation made progress and the Treaty of Lisbon came into force EU 
started to increase its responsibilities and engage in more functions. As in the beginning it 
was highlighting the cooperation between different actors in the region, it now started 
increasingly stressing its lead in regard to some functions. Furthermore, it launched the 
comprehensive approach in regard to Horn of Africa through which it engaged itself with 
tasks that could, according to Morgenthau, be defined as methods of imperialistic foreign 
policy. However, as it most frequently used instrumentalities in Operation Atalanta to 
struggle for power were connected to displaying its military capabilities, seeking positive 
publicity, increasingly stressing its successes in combating piracy as wel as having high 
profile visits from international political leaders and its counterparts, the claim that it was 
stil implementing policy of prestige is wel supported. However, it was not implementing 
policy of prestige to contribute towards status quo anymore but to increase its power and to 
amend the power distribution to more equal between itself and the other major global 
security actors, mainly U.S. and NATO. 
The previous claim is supported also by the empirical material where EU is demonstrating its 
superiority towards other actors, mainly individual states, in the Gulf area but highlighting 
its eficient cooperation with NATO and U.S. led CMF. Indeed, EU had self-proclaimed to 
be one of the big counter piracy three – equal in terms of power, capabilities and influence 
in the region. Even though Morgenthau uses the definition of aliance in a completely 
diferent way for diferent purpose, its benefits, in particular the close cooperation between 
actors that enables more equal distribution of benefits, applies to EU’s objectives in this 
regard. Indeed, in aliance one’s own power can be added to the power of other nations and 
65 
 
this is exactly what EU was pursuing through the cooperation. It was not trying to claim 
itself as hegemony and overthrow the power of U.S. and NATO but instead shift the power 
structures and locate itself next to them with equal relative power recourses. 
Due to the fact that EU can be seen implementing policy of prestige to increase its power but 
not contributing towards imperialism, I needed to create an additional subcategory for the 
coding scheme. This subcategory is defined as foreign policy seeking to increase 
international power to be considered as a credible security actor next to the other major 
actors and as an alternative global security source balancing the hegemony of the U.S. and 
NATO. The need to establish a new subcategory does not however prove the theory wrong – 
it only extends and modernizes it to comply with the present, more multilateral global 
environment. Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that even though one operation is 
not enough to fundamentaly shift the power structures to the extent that the current power 
equilibrium would be threatened, if EU wil increasingly engage in missions, take 
responsibilities globaly over the other actors and provide to be more useful and skiled when 
it comes to combating complex security threats, the policy of prestige increasing power 
might eventualy shift to implementation of policy of imperialism. 
To truly find the embedded and underlying motives and interests behind EU’s military 
mission engagement beyond its borders as wel as for trying to recognize the situations 
where it in the future might globaly engage in military functions and make generalizations it 
was necessary to tie the results of the analysis of the Operation Atalanta to a larger context. 
It was noted that the change of the foreign policy framework did not only give EU the proper 
tools and instruments to efectively implement its foreign policy and cary out military 
missions outside its teritory, but it also provided motivation and the needed push to truly 
demonstrate itself as a competent and capable global security actor. Furthermore, as 
becoming a global actor is not only determined by internal maters but it also depends on a 
number of external forces the need for EU to continue to demonstrate and pursue power to 
maintain its power position is relevant. Indeed, as power relations are relative and subject to 
change other forces that are not always in the sphere of neither security nor politics can 
undermine its position easily. 
Nevertheless, the foreign policy framework and the policy environment are not enough to 
solely explain EU’s military engagements. EU as a rational actor wil pursue its own interest 
no mater how wel its ambitions are disguised. In regard to the Operation Atalanta, it can be 
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noted that the main motivations to guide its actions were the benefits it gains and 
disadvantages it can prevent. Indeed, by launching it EU was next to the economic and 
geostrategic reasons for example able to consolidate its existence, protect its citizen and 
receive easy and robust prestige for both its actorness and the functionality of the new 
foreign policy framework. To make a naïve generalization, it could be said that EU wil in 
the future engage in missions when the pros exceed the cons and there are substantial gains 
for it and its power relations. 
However, the global world is too complex to make such easy conclusions. Power is a very 
context-depended concept. According to Morgenthau, certain social arangements and 
institutions, even though existing now, do not necessarily exist in the future – at least not in 
same form. The present environment determines the content of power and how it can be 
used. Presently both, the foreign policy framework as wel as EU’s power position together 
with the UN legitimization, enabled EU to implement the policy of prestige through even 
imperialistic means. However, in the future situation might be diferent. If an emerging crisis 
situation is seen as too dificult and having too many risks, EU might retreat and change 
back to implementing policy of prestige contributing to status quo, or even only policy of 
status quo. It can also lose its credibility and thus power by being imperialistic and taking 
over functions that it is not able to complete successfuly and consequently forced back to 
consolidating its existence. Indeed, in the international politics, according to realism, states 
are dependent on their own protection and ensuring survival in anarchic structure of world 
politics otherwise they wil be wiped of the map. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that EU as 
a rational actor would implement policy of prestige to increase its power and engage on the 
mission beyond its borders that could somehow harm its power position and thus safety. 
Furthermore, EU foreign policy is stil essentialy dependent on the national interests of its 
member states. Even though the realistic theory of the foreign policy manifestations would 
leave out some of the interests of the nation states determining their support to EU missions 
since they are not in the sphere of politics, they stil need to be acknowledged. Economic and 
geostrategic motivations together with fear of disadvantages are heavily influential when 
deciding whether to support EU missions or not. Indeed, even though Morgenthau separates 
political sphere from al the other spheres of the facets of human nature, in contemporary 
international relations in practice everything is interelated and al of the diferent 
perspectives capture important aspects of politics. There is no action taken without 
contemplating al aspects and benefits of the action first. Indeed, in recent years, especialy 
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the economic aspect, next to the humanitarian and the power-seeking ones, has been 
pronounced. The realistic theory of policy manifestations seeking power does not give too 
much tools to analyze these motivations in detail, but gives enough space to use them to 
bring deeper rationale to the research. 
As mentioned before, the member states of the EU have, due to the unanimous decision-
making in the field of foreign politics, overiding control of the EU external actions. The 
member states have the power to either paralyze EU or to strengthen it. As the power 
relations are ever changing as elaborated previously, the paralysis might have a drastic 
impact. Indeed, it can easily repeal the power EU gained through Operation Atalanta and 
reduce EU’s influence and credibility that it can only implement policy of status quo 
anymore. In launching Operation Atalanta the states were working together in a coherent 
manner and were able to take actions and implement policy of prestige. However, this is not 
always the case. Indeed, the study could be taken further by including the analysis of the 
primary motivations of the individual member states and to see how they in their national 
capacity efect on isolated actions and engagements in the field of EU foreign politics, what 
kind of objectives and underlying motivations they have for geting EU involved in crisis 
situations globaly and which kind of environments encourage them to give green light for a 
launch of an EU military mission beyond the European continent. Furthermore, it would be 
indeed interesting, as states in general do not always have the same aspirations and interests, 
to review whose interests weight the most and whether an EU military operation that has a 
potential of bringing along lot if disadvantages to the EU could be launch basing on the 
interest of just few member countries. 
Al in al, the thesis was able to answer the research questions set at the beginning and make 
conclusions that the EU is presently implementing policy of prestige to pursue an increase of 
power. Hence, it is likely that it wil increasingly engage on missions beyond its teritory in 
the future and seek a stronger and more centralized power position. Consequently, it is 
chalenging the hegemony of the present big security actors, not by overthrowing their power 
positions, but by adjusting them more equal and thus presenting itself as an alternative global 
security source. However, as the global world, emerging security threats, and power and 
social relations are more complex and fluid, situations change rapidly. Indeed, we can try to 
predict what EU wil and wil not intentionaly pursue in the future, but whether it wil be 
successful with reaching its goals, we are uncertain. Nevertheless, by studying the interests 
and actions of EU in the field of foreign politics, as in this case the launch and 
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implementation of Operation Atalanta, together with the current and more broad global 
context we are one step closer to understanding its future power position and power 
structures of the world and thus the functioning of the global security architecture. 
It is beter to lead from behind and to put others in front, especialy when you 
celebrate victory when nice things occur. You take the front line when there is 
danger. Then people wil appreciate your leadership. (Nelson Mandela.) 
When we are no longer able to change a situation – we are chalenged to change 
ourselves (Viktor E. Frankl). 
Be the chief but never the lord (Lao Tzu). 
  
69 
 
6. Bibliography 
6.1. Empirical material 
(EU Council1) Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008 on the European 
Union military coordination in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) (EU 
NAVCO). 
(EU Council2) Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European 
Union military operation to contribute to the deterence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. 
(EU Council3) Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a 
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterence, prevention and repression 
of acts of piracy and armed robbery of the Somali coast (Atalanta). 
(EU Council 4) Council Conclusions 10938/09 of 15 June 2009 on the Operation Atalanta. 
(EU Council5) Council Decision of 8 December 2009 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery of the Somali coast. 
(EU Council6) Council Decision 2010/126 CFSP of 1 March 2010 amending Common 
Position 2009/138/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia. 
(EU Council7) Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP of 7 December 2010 amending Joint 
Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union Last checked 28.4.2014.military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery 
of the Somali coast. 
(EU Council 8) Council Conclusions 16858/11 of 14 November 2011 on the Horn of Africa 
and the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. 
(EU Council9) Council Conclusions 6813/12 of 27 February 2012 on counter piracy 
operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA. 
(EU Council10) Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP of 23 March 2012 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a Euro pean Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery of the Somali coast. 
70 
 
EU NAVFOR (27.12.2008). Operation Atalanta’s First Pirate Engagement. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/operation-atalantas-first-pirate-engagement/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (6.3.2009). European Union Signs Prosecution Agreement with Kenya. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/european-union-signs-prosecution-agreement-with-kenya/; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (19.3.2009). The United Kingdom’s Minister for The Armed Forces visits EU 
NAVFOR Headquarters in Northwood. htp:/eunavfor.eu/the-united-kingdoms-minister-for-
the-armed-forces-visits-eu-navfor-headquarters-in-northwood/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (30.3.2009). Op Atalanta Force Commander meets his Chinese Counterpart. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/op-atalanta-force-commander-meets-his-chinese-counterpart/; Last 
checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (16.7.2009). News in Brief: Unprecedented Cooperation and coordination at 
every level. htp:/eunavfor.eu/news-in-brief-unprecedented-cooperation-and-coordination-
at-every-level/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (24.7.2009). Unprecented Coordination against piracy at sea. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/unprecented-coordination-against-piracy-at-sea/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (30.7.2009). Media Day: “Now we have an understanding of how EU 
NAVFOR works”. htp:/eunavfor.eu/media-day-now-we-have-an-understanding-of-how-eu-
navfor-works/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (28.8.2009). Commander EU NAVFOR visits CTF 151. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/commander-eu-navfor-visits-ctf-151/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (2.9.2009). The Swedish Minister of Defence visits EU NAVFOR. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/the-swedish-minister-of-defence-visits-eu-navfor/; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (9.10.2009). Ambassador praises EU NAVFOR. htp:/eunavfor.eu/french-
ambassador-for-antipiracy-coordination-praises-eu-navfor-atalanta/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (12.10.2009). EU Ambassadors visit EU NAVFOR in the area of operations. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-ambassadors-visit-eu-navfor-in-the-area-of-operations/; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
71 
 
EU NAVFOR (23.11.2009). EUROPEAN UNION meets China in Gulf of Aden. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-meets-china-in-gulf-of-aden/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (19.1.2010). Chairman of the European Union Military Commitee (EUMC) 
visits EU NAVFOR. htp:/eunavfor.eu/chairman-of-the-european-union-military-
commitee-eumc-visits-eu-navfor/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (26.2.2010). EU NAVFOR Somalia – OPERATION ATALANTA Expands 
Its Mission On Piracy. htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-somalia-operation-atalanta-expands-its-
mission-on-piracy/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (19.4.2010). High Representative Catherine Ashton (High Representative of 
EU Foreign Afairs and Security Policy) visits EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/high-representative-catherine-ashton-high-representative-of-eu-foreign-
afairs-and-security-policy-visits-eu-navfor-somalia-operation-atalanta/; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (6.5.2010). King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden visits EU NAVFOR flagship 
HSwMS Carlskrona. htp:/eunavfor.eu/king-carl-xvi-gustaf-of-sweden-visits-eu-navfor-
flagship-hswms-carlskrona/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (8.5.2010). EU NAVFOR Opens In Brussels – Portes Ouvertes. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-opens-in-brussels-portes-ouvertes/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (21.5.2010). EU High Representative Catherine Ashton visited EU NAVFOR 
Flag ship HSwMS Carlskrona. htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-high-representative-catherine-ashton-
visited-eu-navfor-flag-ship-hswms-carlskrona/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (29.10.2010). Seycheles Foreign Afairs Minister visits EU NAVFOR 
Operation Headquarters. htp:/eunavfor.eu/seycheles-foreign-afairs-minister-visits-eu-
navfor-operational-headquarters/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (1.12.2010). Princess Anne visits EU NAVFOR in Seycheles. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/princess-anne-visits-eu-navfor-in-seycheles/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (15.12.2010). European Union’s Naval Force counter-piracy operation enters 
its 3rd year as an extension to 2012 is confirmed. htp:/eunavfor.eu/european-unions-naval-
force-counter-piracy-operation-enters-its-3rd-year-as-an-extension-to-2012-is-confirmed-2/; 
72 
 
EU NAVFOR (31.3.2011). Tanzanian Minister visits EUNAVFOR OHQ. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/tanzanian-minister-visits-eunavfor-ohq/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (13.6.2011). EU NAVFOR hosts Media Day in Mombasa. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-hosts-media-day-in-mombasa/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (24.6.2011). Visit to EUNAVFOR by His Excelency Mahamoud Ali 
Youssouf. htp:/eunavfor.eu/visit-to-eunavfor-by-his-excelency-mahamoud-ali-youssouf/; 
Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (22.8.2011). EU High Representative Visits French EU Naval Force Warship 
FS La Fayete Whilst in Kenya and Somalia. htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-high-representative-
onboard-french-eu-naval-force-warship-fs-la-fayete-during-visit-to-kenya-and-somalia/; 
Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (25.10.2011). Media Day in Mombasa. htp:/eunavfor.eu/media-day-in-
mombasa/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (21.11.2011). Counter Piracy Forces receive Lloyd’s List “Newsmaker of the 
Year” Award. htp:/eunavfor.eu/counter-piracy-forces-receive-loyds-list-newsmaker-of-
the-year-award/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (10.12.2011). Interview with Rear Admiral Thomas E. P. Jugel on handover 
of EU NAVFOR Force Commander. htp:/eunavfor.eu/interview-with-rear-admiral-thomas-
e-p-jugel-on-handover-of-eu-navfor-force-commander/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (22.2.2012). The EU NAVFOR Commander welcomes the President of the 
Seycheles and other senior visitors to the Operation Headquarters. htp:/eunavfor.eu/the-eu-
navfor-commander-welcomes-the-president-of-the-seycheles-and-other-senior-visitors-to-
the-operation-headquarters/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (26.4.2012). Media Event Held on board HNLMS Van Amstel in Dar Es 
Salaam. htp:/eunavfor.eu/media-event-held-on-board-hnlms-van-amstel-in-dar-es-salaam/; 
Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (14.5.2012). EU Anti-Piracy Operation Atalanta at EU Open Day. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-anti-piracy-operation-atalanta-at-eu-open-day/; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
73 
 
EU NAVFOR (23.7.2012). Counter-Piracy “Big Three” Meet At Sea. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/counter-piracy-big-three-meet-at-sea/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (24.8.2012). Counter-Piracy ‘Big Three’ Meet At Sea. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/counter-piracy-big-three-meet-at-sea-2/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (6.9.2012). Swedish Minister of Defence HE Karin Enstrom Visits EU Naval 
Force. htp:/eunavfor.eu/swedish-minister-of-defence-he-karin-enstrom-visits-eu-naval-
force/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (5.10.2012). EU NAVFOR Force Commander Meets Media Representatives 
On Board His Flagship in Muscat (Oman). htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-force-commander-
meets-media-representatives-on-board-his-flagship-in-muscat-oman/; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (3.12.2012). EU Naval Force embarks Somali and Djiboutian Media On 
Board Flagship. htp:/eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-embarks-somali-and-djiboutian-media-on-
board-flagship-2/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (8.3.2013). Force Commander Of EU Naval Force Reinforces Role Of 
Operation Atalanta In EU Comprehensive Approach To Somalia. htp:/eunavfor.eu/force-
commander-of-eu-naval-force-reinforces-role-of-operation-atalanta-in-eu-comprehensive-
approach-to-somalia/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (11.3.2013). European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta 
Launches Facebook Page. htp:/eunavfor.eu/european-union-naval-force-eu-navfor-somalia-
operation-atalanta-launches-facebook-page/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
EU NAVFOR (22.1.2014). Media Visit On Board Ukrainian Frigate Hetman Sagaidachniy. 
htp:/eunavfor.eu/media-visit-on-board-ukrainian-frigate-hetman-sagaidachny/; Last 
checked 28.4.2014. 
6.2. References 
Ali-Laurila, Annina (2005). Uusvanha imperiumi – Milaista kansainvälistä asemaa 
Euroopan unioni tavoitelee perustuslailisen sopimuksen määritämälä ulkopolitikala? 
MA University of Jyväskylä. 
74 
 
Bonvicini, Gianni and Comeli, Michele (2009). Deepening and widening in European 
foreign and security policy. htp:/www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=2&contentid=88 Last 
checked 28.4.2014. 
Curtis, Randal, Wenrich Marjorie, Carline, Jan, Shannon, Sarah, Ambrozy, Donna and 
Ramsey, Paul (2001). Understanding Physicians' Skils at Providing End-of-Life Care: 
Perspectives of Patients, Families, and Health Care Workers. Journal of General Internal 
Medicine 16, 41-49. 
Donnely, Jack (2000). Realism and International Relations. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Downe-Wamboldt (1992). Content Analysis: Method, Applications, and Issues. Health Care 
for Women International 13(3), 313-21. 
Ehrhart, Hans-Georg and Petreto, Kerstin (2012). The EU and Somalia: Counter-Piracy and 
the Question of a Comprehensive Approach. Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and 
Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. 
Europa (2010). Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
htp:/europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_afairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0025_en.
htm; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Europa (2014). The Treaty at Glance. 
htp:/ec.europa.eu/archives/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Ferraro, Vincent (2014). Political Realism. 
htps:/www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/realism.htm; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Fiot, Daniel (2013). Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention. The International 
History Review 35(4), 766-782. 
Frei, Christoph (2001). Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intelectual Biography. International 
Journal on World Peace 18(3), 82-84. 
Fritz-Vannahme, Joachim (2009). Europe’s Bold New Story, Spotlight Europe 2009/04, 
htp:/aei.pit.edu/10813/, Last checked: 28.4.2014. 
75 
 
Geabel, Catja (2011). European Foreign Policy after the Lisbon Treaty. 
htp:/www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29928-1522-2-30.pdf?120321134356; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
Gegout, Catherine (2009). The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (1996-2004). International Peacekeeping 16 (2), 231-244. 
Germond, Basil and Smith, Michael E.(2009). Re-Thinking European Security Interests and 
the ESDP: Explaining the EU's Anti-Piracy Operation, Contemporary Security Policy 30(3), 
573-593. 
Grant, Richard 1998. The political geography of European integration. In Graham, Brian 
(ed.), Modern Europe – Place, Culture and Identity. New York: Oxford University Press, 
145-163. 
Grevi, Giovanni, Hely, Damien and Keohane, Daniel (2009). European Security and 
Defence Policy: the First 10 Years. Paris: Institute for Security Studies. 
Grifits, Martin (1999). Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations. Florence, KY: 
Routledge. 
Guba, Egon G. and Lincoln, Yvonna S. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research. In Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Yvonna S. (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research 
Thousand Oaks: Sage, 105-117. 
Guilhot, Nicholas (2013). Politics between and beyond Nations: Hans Morgenthau’s Politics 
Among Nations. In Bliddal, Henrik, Sylvest, Casper and Wilson, Peter (eds.), Classics of 
International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation. Milton Park: Routledge, 69-
80. 
Gurian, Waldemar (1949). Reviews – International Politics. The Review of Politics 11(2), 
255-259. 
Hass, Richard (2008). The Age of Nonpolarity - What Wil Folow U.S. Dominance. 
htp:/acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/EmpireOverNonpolarHauss.FA08.x
.pdf; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Haukkala, Hiski (2008). The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies 60(9), 1601-1622. 
76 
 
Haukkala, Hiski and Ojanen, Hanna (2002). Ulko- ja turvalisuuspolitikan haasteet. In 
Raunio, Tapio and Tilikainen, Teija (eds.) Euroopan rajat. Laajentuva Euroopan Unioni. 
Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 200-229. 
Hindrén, Rasmus (2007). Tiedonintressit, Politisen Realismin Kritikki ja Emansipatorisen 
Realismin Mahdolisuudet. MA University of Helsinki. 
Hirsijärvi, Sirkka, Pirkko Remes and Paula Sajavaara (2009). Tutki ja Kirjoita. Helsinki: 
Tammi. 
House of Lords (2010). Combating Somali Piracy: The EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta. 
(HL103 of 2009-10). London: The Stationary Ofice. 
Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang and Sarah Shannon (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content 
Analysis. Qualitative Health Research 15(9), 1277–1288. 
Hyde-Price, Adrian (2008). A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical power Europe’, 
International Afairs 84(1), 29–44. 
Iskanius, Annina (2008). Neofunktionalismi Euroopan Unionin krisinhalinnan selitäjänä: 
halinnolinen funktio, yliläikkymisen seuraus, vai mikä? MA. University of Helsinki. 
Jackson. Robert and Sorenson, Georg (2010). Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jude, Sorana-Christina (2012). Saving Strangers in Libya: Traditional and Alternative 
Discourses on Humanitarian Intervention. Nice: European Institute. 
Jütersonke, Oliver (2006). Hans J. Morgenthau on the Limits of Justiciability in International 
Law. Journal of the History of International Law 8(2006), 181-211. 
Kamara, Abdul (2010). How Africa could suffer from the EU’s economic slowdown. 
htp:/ictsd.org/i/news/tni/87751/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Kaufman, Robert (2006). Morgenthau’s Unrealistic Realism. Yale Journal of International 
Afairs 1(2), 24-38.   
Keisala, Katja (2004). The European Union as an International Actor: Strengths of the 
European Civilian Power. Ph.D. University of Tampere. 
77 
 
Knafl, Kathleen and Howard, Marion (1984). Interpreting and Reporting Qualitative 
Research. Research in Nursing and Health 7(1), 17-24. 
Koehler, Kateryna (2010). European Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as 
an International Actor. Caucasian Review of International Afairs 4(1), 57-72. 
Koenig, Nicole (2011) The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence? The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Afairs 46(4), 11-30. 
Koskenniemi, Marti (2002). Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fal of International 
Law 1870-1960. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Larik, Joris (2013). Europe’s Fight Against Piracy: From the Barbary Coast to Operation 
Atalanta. Fondation Pierre du Bois 4(2013). 
Manners, Ian (2002); Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235-58. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 
Merit, Giles (2010). Shaping Europe's global role I: Why the EU badly needs a new political 
narative. htp:/europesworld.org/2010/10/01/shaping-europes-global-role-i-why-the-eu-
badly-needs-a-new-political-narative/; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Morgenthau, Hans (1933). La Notion du “Politique” et la Théorie des Diférends 
Internationaux. Paris: Libraire du Recueil Sirey. 
Morgenthau, Hans (1948). Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Morgenthau, Hans (1960). Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Morgenthau, Hans (2006). Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. Boston : McGraw-Hil Higher Education. 
Neascu, (2009) Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment 
and Re-Enchantment. London: Palgrave MacMilan. 
78 
 
Nnwobunwene, S.C.F. and Orubani, Adaye (2010). Piracy in Somalia and Operation 
Atalanta: The Need for a Diplomatic Option. An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal, 
Ethiopia 4(4), 561-572. 
Norheim-Martisen, Per M. (2011). European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in 
Operation? Contemporary Security Policy 32(3), 517-534. 
Oceans Beyond Piracty (2013). The Economic Costs of Somali Piracy 2012. 
htp:/oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/economic-cost-somali-piracy-2012; Last 
checked 28.4.2014. 
Page, Greg (2011). Motives for European Union Common Security and Defense Policy 
Selection. MA. Naval Postgraduate School. 
Palonen, Kari (2006). The Struggle with Time: A Conceptual History of 'politics' as an 
Activity. Hamburg: Lit Verlag.  
Palonen, Kari (1998). Tekstistä Politikkaan: Johdatusta Tulkintataitoon. Tampere: 
Vastapaino. 
Paul, Jonas (2008). EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon - Wil the New High Representative and 
the External Action Service Make a Diference? C2(2008). 
Pery, Rana and Sobh, Chad (2006). Research Design and Data Analysis in Realism 
Research. European Journal of Marketing 40(11/12), 1194-1209. 
Pirozzi, Nicoleta and Sandawi, Sammi (2009). Military and Civilian ESDP missions: Ever 
Growing and Effective? htp:/www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0929.pdf; Last accessed 28.4.2014. 
Romaniuk, Scot Nicholas (2011). The Entire World’s a Stage: The EU’s Strategic Presence 
in the Contemporary International Arena. Romanian Journal of European Afairs 11(2), 5-
30. 
Rufa, Chiara (2011). Realist-normative Power Europe? Explaining EU Policies toward 
Lebanon from an IR Perspective. Comparative European Politics 9(4-5), 562-580. 
Schmidt, Brian C. (2007). Realism and Facets of Power in International Relations. In 
Berenskoeter, Felix and Wiliams, M.J. (eds.), Power in World Politics International 
Relations. New York: Routledge, 43-64. 
79 
 
Solana, Javier (2005). The Future of the European Union as an International Actor. 
htp:/ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/articles/84349.pdf; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
Stubb, Alexander (2010). Valtioneuvoston selonteko Suomen osalistumisesta EU NAVFOR 
Atalantaan.htp:/puheenvuorot.kansanmuisti.fi/istunnot/91-2010/7676-valtioneuvoston-
selonteko-suomen-osalistumisesta-eu-n-sotilaaliseen-krisinhalintaoperaatioon-eunavfor-
atalantaan; Last checked 28.4.2014. 
Tilikainen, Teija (1998). Europe Needs a Common Identity? A Comment upon the Core 
Problems of the CFSP. In Koskenniemi, Marti (Ed.), International Law Aspects of the EU. 
London: Kluwer, 19-25. 
Toledo, Peter (2005). Classic Realism and the Balance of Power Theory. 
htp:/www.google.fi/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd; Last checked 
28.4.2014. 
Tuomi, Jouni and Sarajärvi, Anneli (2002). Laadulinen Tutkimus ja Sisälönanalyysi. 
Helsinki: Tammi. 
Van Lagenhove, Luk (2010). The EU as a Global Actor in a Multipolar World and 
Multilateral 2.0 Environment. 
htp:/www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/user_upload/Egmont_paper_36_by_Luk_Van_Langenho
ve.pdf; Last checked 28.4.2014.  
Waltz, Kenneth (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hil. 
Weber, Robert (1990). Basic Content Analysis. Beverly Hils: Sage.  
Wheeler, Nicholas J.(2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Welsh, Jennifer M. (2004). Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian 
Intervention. Welsh, Jennifer (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 52-70. 
Wright, Nick (2011). The European Union: What Kind of International Actor? Political 
Perspectives 5(2), 8-32. 
